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PRESENTATION
This is the eleventh year that the weekly dispatches transmitted during a year from ECLAC 
Washington to ECLAC’s headquarters and other subregional offices are gathered in a single 
document.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by subject and ordered 
chronologically within each chapter. Each chapter heading indicates the relative saliency of these 
issues within the international economic agenda.
The three most important issues which dominated the international economic agenda 
throughout the year are listed here according to what is, avowedly, a very subjective ordering of their 
relative importance.
1) The amazing performance of the U.S. economy persisted throughout the year. The present 
expansion of the U.S. economy, although in its eighth year, remains the third longest of the post-war, 
still short from the 92-month expansion of the Reagan years in the eighties, and the 106 month 
expansion o f the Vietnam War in
the sixties. What is amazing about the present expansion is that it is taking place with very low rates 
of inflation, of around 2.5 percent, and very low rates of unemployment, of less than 5 percent.
2) The instability and vulnerability experienced by the East Asian economies, during the 
second half of the year, took almost everybody by surprise. Some of the fastest growing economies in 
the world, such as Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, experienced instability and had to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. Perhaps most surprising was the speed with which 
the instability was transmitted to all the markets of the world. Some pessimists saw the instability and 
vulnerability of these economies as evidence that the so-called East Asian "miracle" is coming to an 
end.
3) Finally, the rejection by the U.S. House of Representatives, controlled by the Republican 
Party, of President Clinton’s request for authorization to negotiate trade agreements on "fast track," 
caused shivers around the world. The main concern is that this rejection could be evidence that the 
specter o f protectionism is gaining ground among both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 
United States.
These and other issues were described throughout the year in the regular transmissions of the 
weekly dispatch. The purpose of gathering these dispatches is to make them available for easier 
consultation in a single document, in case the Washington D.C. vantage point they present still has 
some testimonial value.
Those readers not familiarized with the dispatches should be reminded that they try to remain 
within a self-imposed limit of 750 words, because their purpose is to bring an issue to the reader’s 
attention.
1 ECLAC Washington, International Economic Highlights (LC/W AS/L.2) 17 August 1988; (L C/W AS/L .4) 17 
March 1989; (LCAVAS/L.8) 15 March 1990; (L C /W A S /L .ll) 22 March 1991; (LC/W AS/L.14) 11 March 1992; 
(LC /W A S/L .17) 11 March 1993; (LC/W AS/L.23) 30 March 1994; (LCAVAS/L.27) 21 February 1995; (LCAVAS/L.33) 8 
March 1996; (LC/W AS/L .39) 20 January 1997.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
1.1. TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES 
(WDW/3/96 5 FEBRUARY 1997)
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FED), Alan Greenspan says that we are going 
through one o f those rare periods of "radical transformations in what we produce in the way of goods 
and services and how we produce them. "
Periods o f radical transformation, according to Chairman Greenspan, "occur perhaps once or 
twice in a century, at most." He cites as examples the development of railroads and of the telegraph 
in the United States, after the Civil War, as decisive factors in the emergence of a national market.
He also mentions the expansion of electricity, at the beginning of this century, as a revolution in 
productive capabilities.
Chairman Greenspan holds that the present transformation is characterized by "the 
displacement o f human physical effort by ideas," under which "concepts and ideas . . . substitute for 
physical resources and human brawn in the production of goods and services."
However, the present transformation has yet to reflect itself in productivity data. This is 
caused, according to the FED Chairman, by the uncertainties that characterize the processes of 
adoption o f new technologies. He also raises "a serious question about the quality of the data we 
employ to measure output in today’s economy."
These uncertainties that characterize the adoption of new technologies have been described by 
Stanford University Professor Nathan Rosenberg in a paper titled Uncertainty and Technological 
Change, presented to the Federal Bank of Boston’s Conference on Technology and Growth, held in 
Chatham, Massachusetts, on 5-7 June 1996. Professor Rosenberg describes at least five "sources of 
uncertainty," which make difficult to anticipate the impact of technological innovations.
First, technologies "often come into the world with properties and characteristics whose 
usefulness cannot be immediately appreciated." As examples, he offers the present slow process of 
using the laser and the several decades it took to discover the uses of electricity. Even aspirin, used 
for almost a century, was only recently discovered to be useftil to reduce the risk of heart attacks.
Second, the "impact of an innovation depends, not only on improvements of the invention, 
but also upon improvements that take place in complementary inventions." For instance, it took a 
while before the link between the laser and telephones was discovered, because fiber optics were not 
yet available. Only the availability of both the laser and fiber optics has led to the transformation of 
telephone communication.
Third, "thinking about new technologies is likely to be severely handicapped by the tendency 
to think of them in terms of the old technologies that they eventually replace." There are many
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examples of how such "path dependence" hinders thinking about the uses of new technologies. 
Railroads were first conceived as feeders to canal systems. The same is true of the telephone whose 
patent was titled by Bell as "improvements in telegraphy."
Fourth, "many major inventions had their origins in the attempt to solve very specific, and 
often very narrowly defined, problems." Therefore, it has been difficult to foresee the uses of the new 
' technology. For example, the steam engine was invented as a pump and more than a century had to 
pass before it became a "generalizable source of power and had major applications in transportation."
Finally, "new technologies need to pass an economic test, not just a technological one." The 
radio was invented as a device for transmitting messages, but somebody else had the vision of using 
the radio to transmit entertainment and information to every household. The same with computers, 
invented for "the numerical solution of large sets o f differential equations, " it was not seen as a 
machine to serve as a cash register in department stores.
There are many cases of someone different from the inventor having the vision to discover a 
new use for an existing technology, or to combine several available technologies into a new product. 
The walkman and the VCR are good examples of products developed by the Japanese electronic 
industry based on products invented in the United States.
A main conclusion drawn by Professor Rosenberg is that uncertainty prevails not only in the 
process of invention, it is also present in the process of product design and development, in "the D of 
R&D."
Professor Rosenberg also suggests these uncertainties should persuade governments "to resist 
the temptation to play the role of a champion of any one technological alternative," as with nuclear 
power, or the fight against cancer. It is better to support "a deliberately diversified research 
portfolio" aimed at opening "many windows and to provide the private sector with financial incentives 
to explore" those windows. Additionally, the market "also provides strong incentives to terminate 
quickly and unsentimentally, directions of research whose once-rosy prospects have been unexpectedly 
dimmed."
To compound these uncertainties, Chairman Greenspan adds others emanating from the poor 
measurements available of productivity and of standards of living. For instance, if the unit of output 
is well defined, the price per unit will be known. However, Chairman Greenspan asks "what is the 
unit of software," or the unit of output of medical care, as in the removal of cataracts.
I. 2. NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO BORROW (NAB) 
(WDW/5/97 19 FEBRUARY 1997)
Two years after the Mexican financial crisis signaled the insufficiency of financial resources 
available to respond to such crises, on January 27, the Executive Board of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) adopted the decision to create New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).
3
The objectives of the new arrangements remain the same as those of their still available 
predecessor, the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB). First, "to make loans to the IMF when 
supplementary resources are needed to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international 
monetary system. " Second, to deal with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the stability of 
the system. "
Given these objectives, despite assertions to the contrary, the NAB constitute the 
institutionalized manifestation, or the formalized expression, of the will to carry out the essential task 
o f lender of last resort. As the GAB, this is also a cooperative effort, which now involves twenty-five 
countries willing to assume collectively such responsibility.
The new mechanism does not replace the existent, both remain in force and amount together 
to $74 billion. However, the NAB is "the facility of first and principal recourse in the event of a need 
to provide supplementary resources to the IMF. "
The original participants in the GAB--the members of the Group of Ten industrial countries, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, in addition to Saudi Arabia as associate-remain the principal contributors to the new 
arrangements.
The newcomers together will contribute almost 15 percent of the total, with Australia and 
Spain as the largest contributors with 2.2 and 2 percent, respectively. All the others, including 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Norway,
Singapore, and Thailand, contribute each around 1 percent of the total.
However, in terms of relative participation, although the original members of the GAB have 
increased the amounts contributed to the new arrangement, their relative participation has decreased. 
For instance, the United States remains the largest contributor to both mechanisms, but its relative 
participation has gone down from 25 percent in the GAB to almost 20 percent in the NAB. The same 
with Japan and Germany, from 14 and 12.5 percent to 10.4 percent, while France and the United 
Kingdom have moved from 10 percent to 7.5 percent.
Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that the new participants have come to alleviate the 
burden of the original members, with the responsibility now more widespread and shared among a 
larger group of countries.
With the admission of the mid-size industrialized economies of Europe, including 
Luxembourg, and the Asian Tigers, including Hong Kong, the new mechanism reflects more 
accurately the present stratification of the world economy.
The new arrangements can also be seen as the first step in the direction of adapting the 
existing institutional framework to the transformations of the world economy. More accurately than 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), sometimes characterized as 
"the club of the rich" with its more restricted and heterogeneous membership, the NAB represents 
today a meeting point for the most significant economies of the world.
Credits under the NAB can be granted to an IMF member that is a participant in the NAB, or
4
for the benefit of an IMF member that is not a participant in the new arrangements.
New members can be admitted at the time of renewal, with the agreement of participants 
representing 80 percent of total credit arrangements, or with the approval of 85 percent if admission 
is sought at other times.
The NAB will enter into force, for a renewable period of five years, when participants 
representing at least $41 billion adhere to the decision, including the five members that contribute the 
largest proportions, the United States $6.7 billion; Japan and Germany $3.5 billion each; and France 
and the United Kingdom $2.5 billion each.
Procedures for the functioning of the NAB are relatively simple. Participants will meet once a 
year, during the Annual Meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions and the chair will rotate annually 
in the English alphabetical order of the participants. Under the direction of the chair, staff from IMF 
headquarters will provide secretariat support for the functioning of the arrangements.
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus welcomed the creation of the NAB as "a 
milestone in the membership’s efforts to strengthen the IMF." He also said that the agreement was 
"an important and timely reflection of ongoing changes in the world economy."
However, Managing Director Camdessus recalled that the members of the IMF Board also 
stated that "the NAB cannot be a substitute for the strengthening of quotas-which is the capital basis 
for the IMF." He said he was hopeful about accomplishing "rapid progress in reaching a conclusion 
on a significant increase in IMF quotas under the Eleventh General Review," which is under way.
A significant increase in IMF quotas, concluded Mr. Camdessus, will "further complete the 
effort of adapting the IMF’s resources to the current world situation and risks."
I. 3. THE IMF’S FIRST WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WEO) 
(WDW/13/97 21 MAY 1997)
The advanced copy of the first WEO was released on April 23, as every year, just before the 
spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
This year’s single volume is dedicated to the challenges and opportunities of globalization and 
contains the following chapters: I) policy considerations and issues for discussion; II) world economic 
situation and short-term prospects; III) meeting the challenges of globalization in the advanced 
economies; IV) globalization and the opportunities for developing countries; V) integration of the 
transition economies into the global economy. Finally, a specific annex is dedicated to placing 
globalization in historical perspective.
After experiencing "widespread deceleration" in 1995, the rate of world economic growth 
"quickened" in 1996, with positive prospects for continued expansion in 1997, due to "generally 
propitious" economic and financial conditions.
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The IMF staff sees "few signs of the tensions and imbalances that usually foreshadow 
significant downturns in the business cycle." This positive outlook relies on the following indicators: 
"global inflation remains subdued, and commitments to reasonable price stability are perhaps stronger 
than at any other time in the postwar era; fiscal imbalances are being reduced with increasing 
determination in many countries, which should help contain real long-term interest rates and foster 
higher investment; and exchange rates among the major currencies appear to be generally consistent 
with broader policy objectives. "
Therefore, world economic output is projected to increase slightly to 4.4 percent in 1997 and 
1998, from 4.0 percent in 1996. This represents a slight upward revision of 0.2 percent of the 
projections for 1997, released last October.
For the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere, output is projected to increase to 
4.4 percent in 1997 and to 5.1 percent in 1998, an upward revision of 0.5 percent of the October 
1996 projections for 1997.
There remain, however, "a number of risks to the central scenario." First, in the European 
Union (EU) "unemployment has risen further to new postwar peaks, and neither prospective growth 
nor the progress made with labor market reforms gives reason to expect any significant decline in 
joblessness in the near future."
Second, recent declines in equity prices in the stock markets of the advanced economies "have 
underscored the risk of a more significant correction, especially if earnings expectations were to be 
downgraded or a reemergence of inflationary pressures were to require a marked rise in interest 
rates."
Third, "caution is warranted" on the persistence of capital flows to the so-called emerging 
markets, "since both global availability of these flows and their cost are vulnerable to higher global 
interest rates and to adverse developments affecting systemically important capital-importing 
countries."
Finally, "fragile banking systems are of concern in a broad spectrum of countries." Some of 
these difficulties have been caused by "excessive credit expansion in the past under conditions of 
inadequate prudential supervision." Consequently, "large portfolios of nonperforming loans, the 
erosion o f banks’ capital bases, and outright banking crises can affect countries’ economic 
performance. "
Among the "advanced economies," there remain contrasting differences in cyclical positions. 
For instance, the "favorable performance" of the United Kingdom and the United States contrasts with 
the "record levels" at which unemployment remains in France, Germany and Italy. Additionally, in 
Japan "uncertainty in financial markets" raises doubts about the persistence of the momentum of the 
economy’s recovery.
In the developing countries growth reached 6.5 percent in 1996, with stronger activity in 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East and a moderate slowdown in Asia.
Among the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere a better performance is expected 
for 1997, "as recoveries in several countries gain momentum, and inflation is projected to moderate 
further."
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By contrast, growth in the developing economies of Asia registered a moderate slowdown in 
1996, to 8.2 percent, and it is expected to decrease in the near future to a rate of 7.7 percent in 1998. 
Some of these economies, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, are experiencing an export 
slowdown, which coincided with tighter domestic policies aimed at reducing overheating.
Among the transition economies contrasting performances have become more pronounced 
among the early, relatively successful reformers and those that started adjustment and reform later. 
After a disappointing average growth of 0.1 percent for 1996, the transition economies are expected 
to grow at three and 4.8 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively.
Finally, notice is given that starting with this issue, the term "industrialized economies" will 
no longer be used in the WEO. With the addition of several newly industrialized economies of Asia, 
such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, Province of China, and Israel, the expanded 
group of countries will be labeled the "advanced economies." This is in recognition, says the WEO, 
"of the declining share of employment in manufacturing common to all these economies."
I. 4. GLOBALIZATION IN THE ADVANCED ECONOMIES
(WDW/15/97 4 JUNE 1997)
As notified by the last World Economic Outlook (WEO), the term "industrialized economies" 
will no longer be used by the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), because of the 
"declining share of manufacturing in these economies" (WDW/13/97, p.4). This new term allows for 
the inclusion of several newly industrialized economies, such as Hong Kong, Israel, Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan, Province of China, which are also experiencing deindustrialization.
Dedicated to the issue of "globalization," the last WEO examines the effects that this process 
is having on the advanced economies. It comes out against the common perception that 
"deindustrialization" in the advanced economies is caused by the globalization of world markets. Two 
relevant questions come under scrutiny. First, if globalization has affected wages, employment and 
income distribution. Second, if globalization has reduced national sovereignty.
To address these issues the WEO focuses on the causes and consequences of 
deindustrialization, how factor mobility is affecting labor markets, and how capital market integration 
is affecting national autonomy in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy.
Globalization is defined as "the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide 
through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of 
international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology."
The welfare benefits of globalization are compared to those of specialization and to those of 
technological progress, as sources of economic growth and structural change. Also, the process is 
compared to the integration that existed between the mid-1800s and the First World War.
However, the contemporary process is different in many ways, because of the number of
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countries involved and the reduction of transportation, telecommunication and computation costs. 
Additionally, through trade, direct investment flows and technology transfers, "the world economy is 
becoming, more and more, the relevant context for economic decisions."
It is in this context that has to be evaluated the deindustrialization of the advanced economies. 
For the United States, the European Union and Japan "the share of manufacturing employment 
declined from 28 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1994." But this has little to do with increased 
openness and trade, it reflects mainly "the impact of unequal rates of productivity growth in 
manufacturing and services."
For this reason, deindustrialization is not negative, because it is associated with rising living 
standards. It is comparable to the drastic reduction experienced in the share of employment in 
agriculture.
To be sure, since not all sectors benefit, the most efficient policy option is to provide 
assistance to those affected by the process, instead of trying to restrict globalization.
The same conclusion is drawn about the increasing interdependence of financial markets. 
Evidence of capital market integration can be found in several indicators. For instance, "cross border 
transactions in bonds and equities in the major advanced countries were less than 10 percent of GDP 
in 1980 but were generally well over 100 percent of GDP in 1995."
Another indicator can be found in the average daily turnover of the foreign exchange market, 
which has "grown from $200 billion in the mid-1980s to around $1.2 trillion." Those concerned 
about the capacity of central banks, "to influence exchange rates," are reminded that the daily 
turnover in the foreign exchange market amounts to "approximately 85 percent of all countries’ 
foreign exchange reserves."
This has limited the policy options that are available in this context of vertiginous and intense 
capital flows. For instance, it is no longer possible to pursue simultaneously the following three 
policy objectives: an independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates, and open capital markets.
No more than two of these policy objectives can be pursued simultaneously.
Also, in the present context of high capital mobility, as evidenced by the Mexican crisis, the 
third option of having fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates has become unsustainable. The only options 
left are either permanently fixed exchange rates, as in a monetary union or through a currency board, 
or fully flexible exchange rates.
To conclude, the main effect of globalization on economic policy is to limit the possibility of 
adopting policies that are "incompatible with medium term financial stability." In this sense, increased 
financial market integration will contribute to discipline domestic financial policies. Such policies will 
be rewarded positively, because increased capital flows will contribute to easing financing constraints.
However, if such inflows of resources relax domestic discipline and generate imbalances, 
"markets will eventually exert their own discipline, in such a way that the time period for adjustment 
may be brutally shortened." Therefore, international financial markets may encourage "the adoption 
of appropriate policies," and ultimately reward good policies.
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I. 5. THE DENVER SUMMIT
(WDW/20/97 9 JULY 1997)
Against the background provided by the U.S. economy’s outstanding performance, President 
Clinton hosted the Summit of the Eight in Denver, Colorado, from Friday, June 20 until Sunday,
June 22.
"We host our partners," President Clinton declared on the eve of the Summit, "at a time when 
America’s economy is the healthiest in a generation and the strongest in the world." Using stronger 
language, Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers described the United States as "the world’s 
only economic superpower" and "the world’s most flexible and dynamic economy." U.S. Treasury 
Secretary agreed, saying "today, the United States is once again the most respected economy in the 
world."
Several academics also contributed laudatory remarks. For instance, Harvard University 
Professor Robert Z. Lawrence said "Clinton is presiding over an economy that is doing fantastically 
well in those areas where other countries have great problems, especially unemployment and budget 
deficits." According to Professor Lawrence, "Germany, France and, to some extent, Japan, are all in 
deep denial."
Reactions from other participants in the Summit did not make themselves wait. President 
Chirac said "to each his own model," adding that "we have our own model, and we plan to stick to 
it." An unidentified "senior European Union official" said "it’s a bit arrogant of the Americans to 
assume that what works in Illinois will work in Frankfurt. " Sir Leon Brittan, the European trade 
commissioner was more direct, he said "I don’t think you have to spend a long time in the inner cities 
of the United States to see that all is not a paradise."
Beyond the celebration, President Clinton’s assistant for international economic policy Daniel 
Tarullo said that during the meetings the leaders did not dwell in "comparisons." The final 
communiqué issued by the Group of Seven recognized that the participants’ "circumstances and 
priorities differ. " In relatively more balanced terms, the G-7 communiqué said in the United States, 
"with a long recovery and successful job creation, it is important to remain vigilant against a 
resurgence of inflation, to achieve the full promise of the agreement to balance the federal budget, 
and to promote savings."
However, the center of attention in Denver was not the performance of the U.S. economy.
The presence of President Boris Yeltsin as a full participant, in what became known as the Summit 
of the Eight, dominated the scene. President Yeltsin’s participation was viewed as a payoff for his 
recent acceptance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion.
With President Yeltsin present, henceforward, these annual rituals will now be known as the 
Summit of the Eight. The meetings of the heads of state and government of the Seven most advanced 
economies took only one half-day session, on Saturday afternoon, and their communiqué dealt almost 
exclusively with economic issues.
By contrast, the communiqué issued by the Denver Summit of the Eight "marks a new and 
deeper participation by Russia" and it contains an impressive number of issues, to the point that it was 
characterized in THE NEW YORK TIMES as a "long wish list.
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instance, "global inflation remains subdued," while "fiscal imbalances are being reduced," and 
exchange rates among the major currencies "appear to be consistent with medium-term fundamentals. "
Second, among the advanced economies, "cyclical divergences have remained sizable," with 
considerable "margins of slack" in Japan and Europe. This will sustain the present expansion, when 
the slowdown comes to those economies that have been expanding, such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States.
Finally, the recovery of the economies in transition and the strength of some developing 
economies are "providing both new markets and increased production capacities."
In the medium term, the WEO concludes, "the sustainable rate of world output growth may 
now in fact be somewhat stronger than in the quarter century since the first oil shock. " This positive 
scenario "points to a trend growth of world GDP of about 4 1/2 percent between 1996 and 2002 
compared with an average rate of expansion of 3 1/4 percent since 1970."
Still, "a wide range of risks and fragilities" remain in the following "areas of concern": 1) 
risks of overheating; 2) uncertainties about the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe; and
3) questions about the sustainability of capital flows to emerging market economies.
In the performance of the advanced economies the United States and the United Kingdom "are 
operating at relatively high levels of resource use." The U.S. economy is in its seventh year of 
expansion, combining "solid growth of output and employment with low inflation and a diminishing 
fiscal imbalance."
By contrast, the three major continental European economies, France, Germany, and Italy, 
exhibit an "unsatisfactory performance" which "cannot be blamed on the external environment."
Finally, Japan’s recovery has been "quite hesitant," with growth for 1997 estimated at 1 to 1 
1/4 percent, "substantially weaker than projected in the May 1997 WEO."
In the developing economies, real GDP growth "is expected to remain relatively buoyant at 
slightly over 6 percent in 1997" and in 1998. In the Western Hemisphere, Argentina and Mexico 
continue recovering, with Venezuela experiencing "a welcome turnaround." In Brazil, inflation has 
"continued to abate," but with an increasing external deficit the economy still requires further 
tightening. By contrast, Chile "remains the strongest among the developing countries of the Western 
Hemisphere. "
The rapid expansion in Asia is "projected to moderate somewhat further," due to "recently 
experienced financial market pressures linked to concerns about large external deficits." For instance, 
growth in Thailand will "slow significantly in the short run" by almost four percentage points, with 
spill overs into Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
China’s impressive "soft landing," by contrast, has meant reducing consumer price inflation 
to 4 1/2 percent, from 22 percent in 1994, while maintaining a rate of growth of 9 percent.
Finally, in the transition economies there is "evidence of an end to the decline in output, and 
perhaps of a beginning of growth in Russia" and in all the other countries as a group.
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The projections are that world output growth will increase at 4 1/2 percent in 1998, a "slight 
downward revision" from the rate projected in May (WDW/13/97, p.4). The major downward 
revision of growth prospects among the advanced economies is in Japan, about one percentage point 
for 1998.
For the developing countries as a whole, "slight downward revisions" to the May projections 
leave prospective growth in 1998 above 6 percent.
Among the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere, in 1998, "the recovery of 
growth is still expected to continue" but at 4.4 percent, a lesser pace from the May projections. This 
is mainly due to "main downward revisions" for Brazil and Colombia, because "less sanguine 
assumptions have been made about fiscal adjustment. " By contrast, projected growth for Argentina 
has been revised upwards by 2 1/2 percent, to 7 1/2 percent, due to "continuing progress in reforms, 
the environment of stable prices, and associated gains in private sector confidence."
Despite downward revisions in the projections, because of recent currency turmoil, Asia "is 
projected to remain the fastest growing region in the developing world," at a rate of 7 1/2 percent for 
1997 and 1998.
Finally, in 1997, the economies in transition are projected to experience an increase in output 
of 1 1/2 to 2 percent, "still the first significant positive growth rate in eight years, despite a 
downward revision of over 1 percentage point of the May 1997 projections."
I. 7. WHITHER EAST ASIA?
(WDW/35/97 26 NOVEMBER 1997)
When the Thai baht started plunging, on July 2, nobody anticipated that the contagion would 
spread with such intensity. After almost five months of incessant turbulence, with markets and 
currencies falling like "dominoes," to borrow a metaphor from the sixties, there are enough reasons 
for concern.
Some already see the end of what the World Bank in 1993 described as the East Asian 
"miracle." According to the New York Times, the "miracle" has turned into a "mirage." For others, 
the so-called East Asian "tigers" have been "declawed" and they are "growling," as they turn into 
"paper tigers."
Not so fast, says the World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, in a New York Times op­
ed. "East Asia’s amazing economic transformation in the last few decades has been real." Stiglitz 
mentions how Malaysia and Thailand "virtually eliminated absolute poverty (defined as people living 
on less than a dollar a day." Also, in Indonesia poverty decreased from 64 percent of the population 
in 1975 to 11 percent in 1995.
However, by contrast with the Mexican crisis of 1994, present turbulence is showing that in 
today’s international system, or "nonsystem," even the fastest growing economies are liable to 
become victims of instability. Also evident, but unexplained, is the vertiginous contagion that has
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spread throughout the world. Therefore, key decision makers have stepped forward to reassure 
anxious markets.
The Chairperson of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, on October 29, examined the impact 
o f events in East Asia on the U.S. economy and offered an explanation that appears already as the 
accepted wisdom. First, Chairman Greenspan said that "the direct impact of these developments on 
the American economy has been modest, but it can be expected not to be negligible." The main 
indicator used to gauge this impact is that U.S. exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand were about four percent o f total U.S. exports in 1996. Additionally, around 12 percent of 
U.S. exports went to Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Finally, "there may be indirect 
effects on the U.S. real economy from countries such as Japan that compete even more extensively 
with the economies in the Asian region."
To explain present instability, Chairman Greenspan focuses on the spectacular growth of 
foreign net capital inflows into these fast growing economies, from a negligible $25 billion in 1990 to 
more than $110 billion in 1996.
The search for higher yields, in the global stock market boom of the 1990s, is identified by 
Chairman Greenspan as the "major impetus behind this rapid expansion. " Moreover, he sees as 
"inevitable" that much of these capital flows "moved into the real estate sector," which, "in turn, 
ended up as collateral for a significant proportion of assets o f domestic financial systems." However, 
many of these financial systems "were less than robust, beset with problems of lax lending standards, 
weak supervisory regimes, and inadequate capital."
Two external events hastened the crisis. First, a slowdown in exports from East Asia, without 
a slowdown in overall rates of growth. Additionally, East Asian currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, 
appreciated by more than 50 percent against the Japanese yen. Consequently, "unsustainable current 
account deficits" exercised mounting pressure on fixed exchange rates.
According to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, in testimony presented on 
November 13 to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, "the attempt to maintain a 
fixed nominal exchange rate without concomitant monetary policy commitments-against a backdrop 
o f mounting current account deficits and weak and over-extended financial systems-was an invitation 
for trouble."
The purpose of U.S. policy, Deputy Secretary Summers said, is to restore stability "as soon 
as possible-both to limit the long term impact in the countries concerned and, critically, to limit the 
risk of further contagion across Asia, and across other emerging markets."
The response to the crisis consists in generating a "strong domestic policy response," by 
means o f the "careful provision of international assistance" and preventing other crises through 
"improved transparency and surveillance."
Deeper questions raised by the East Asian crisis derive from an ongoing debate in the United 
States, among young luminaries of the economics profession.
On one side, MIT Professor Paul Krugman said in 1994 that East Asian growth was 
vulnerable because it was like "Communist growth." Both "miracles," Krugman said, were "based
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largely on one time changes that cannot be repeated" such as heavy investment spending rather than 
productivity growth.
No way, says Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs in a paper co-authored with Steven Radelet 
published in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. Their conclusion is that "the Southeast 
Asian currency crises of 1997 are not a sign of the end of Asian growth but rather a recurring~if 
difficult to predict-pattem of financial instability that often accompanies rapid economic growth."
Professor Krugman admitted in the Wall Street Journal that "the fact that this came on so 
suddenly and with so much drama, suggests that it isn’t the long-term slowdown" that he anticipated. 
Only time can tell.
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. OPTIMISM IN 1997 MEANS ’MORE OF THE SAME’ 
(WDW/1/96 22 JANUARY 1997)
With the U.S. economy heading into the seventh year of sustained expansion, way past the 
50-month average o f postwar expansions, most forecasts for 1997 ask for "more of the same. " The 
present expansion is the third longest of the postwar, after the Reagan years’ 92-month expansion of 
the eighties and the Vietnam war’s 106 month expansion of the sixties.
There is almost no contention among forecasters that in 1997 the U.S. economy will keep 
moving at the present slow and steady pace. There is agreement among 57 economists, who 
participate in the WALL STREET JOURNAL’S semiannual survey, that the U.S. economy will 
experience a modest slowdown in GDP growth to an annualized rate of 2 percent.
One key variable to observe is the prevailing low level of inflation, which despite a surge to 
3.3 percent in the consumer price index for 1996, remained at the lowest level in thirty years. 
Further, without food and energy prices, what is known as the "core rate," rose only to 2.6 percent, 
the same as in 1994 and the lowest annual figure since 1965.
Since prices do not seem to offer much guidance, the other closely watched indicator is the 
unemployment rate. The labor market appears tight at around 5.3 percent, the lowest point in 23 
years. Some observers believe that it is already half a percentage under the level consistent with 
stable inflation. However, others point out that labor costs are still rising at the slowest pace in fifty 
years.
Other indicators have become less reliable. For instance, George Melloan in the Wall Street 
Journal, says that the misery index, or the combination of inflation and unemployment rates, is at the 
lowest point in years. Also, Melloan holds that "the old Phillips Curve theory," based on the tradeoff 
between employment and inflation, "has by now been laid to rest," given the prevailing low inflation 
levels accompanied by low unemployment. The same happened to the "natural rate of unemployment, 
set at 6 percent, it was "breached months ago, and nothing happened," said Louis Uchitelle in the 
New York Times.
The signals from the FED are usually enigmatic. For instance, Robert Perry, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, told the Washington Post. "I didn’t think we would get 
through 1996 as comfortably as we did . . . It may have been good luck. I am still not sure we can 
keep the economy at this level of resource utilization without some added inflation. We at the Fed 
have to remain vigilant about this."
As expected, some of the most positive comments are from the Administration. Janet Yellen, 
the new head of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, who comes from the Federal 
Reserve Board, told the Washington Post. "The fundamentals look very, very solid, the economy is
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and 5.4 percent, respectively. These are the lowest inflation rates since 1967 and the lowest annual 
rate o f unemployment since 1988 and previously since 1973.
From the White House, Vice President A1 Gore declared, "the American economy is growing 
and a land of new promise is emerging." As described by Laurence H. Meyer, member of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FED), the "surprise" consists in "a decline in measures of core 
inflation for consumer and producer goods and in the inflation rate for the GDP price index during a 
year when the unemployment rate declined and averaged more that 1/2 percentage point below levels 
that in the past had been associated with stable inflation."
Perhaps even more surprising was the performance of the economy in the last quarter of 
1996, because despite a vigorous 4.7 percent rate of growth, inflation remained subdued, by one 
measurement, at the lowest point in thirty years. The implicit price deflator, in the last quarter 
increased only 1.4 percent, the smallest increase since 1967. Therefore, most surprising was that such 
a spurt in growth did not push the inflation rate higher, because unemployment at 5.3 percent is 
indicating that the labor market, particularly for qualified workers, is already very tight and hourly 
compensation is edging upward.
At least two casualties, among analytic tools, can be claimed by these very impressive 
numbers. First, the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), or the lowest rate of 
unemployment that can be reached without generating inflation. It used to be that 6 percent 
unemployment was perceived as such a threshold. Second, the related equation between inflation and 
unemployment, known as the Phillips Curve, has been recently "over-predicting inflation. "
Several explanations have been offered about why these tools are presently not performing 
adequately. Norbert Walter, chief economist of the Deutsche Bank, said in the New York Times that 
the problem with the NAIRU is that it "does not look beyond national borders." According to 
Norbert, "the NAERU concept may have been destroyed by the creation of global labor pools," which 
have "created a work force that is solving many of America’s NAIRU-related worries from afar. "
In defense of the Phillips Curve came out Laurence H. Meyer, member of the Federal 
Reserve Board. In a speech at the Charlotte Economics Club, on January 16, Meyer criticized those 
who claim that the Phillips Curve "was long ago theoretically discredited and historically repudiated. " 
Such criticism must come from someone, Meyer said, who has "not bothered to look at the data and 
probably has never estimated a Phillips Curve nor tried his or her hand at forecasting inflation. "
One explanation for the present "systematic overprediction errors," that have characterized 
recent estimates of the Phillips Curve, is that the NAIRU has declined, from 6 to 5.5 percent. 
Therefore, what demands an explanation is why inflation has performed better compared with 
unemployment.
The decline in core inflation can be explained, first, by a set of supply shocks in the last two 
years. According to Meyer, "the key is that these supply shocks are generally not included in 
estimated Phillips Curves, so that Phillips Curves missed their effects and over-predicted inflation." 
Recent supply shocks have taken the form of declines in the prices of health care, computers, and 
imports.
Another factor contributing to moderate inflationary pressures is worker insecurity. First,
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there is evidence that "the proportion of workers who have suffered a permanent job loss in recent 
years looks high relative to the 1980s." Second, "workers appear reluctant to voluntarily leave their 
jobs because of an increased apprehension about the difficulty of finding a comparable new job."
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, testifying in the Senate illustrated such 
"heightened job insecurity" quoting a recent survey of workers’ perceptions. Chairman Greenspan 
declared, "in 1991, at the bottom of the recession, a survey of workers at large firms indicated that 
25 percent feared being laid off. In 1996, despite the sharply lower unemployment rate and the 
demonstrably tighter labor market, the same survey organization found that 46 percent were fearful of 
job layoff. "
Finally, another factor that explains the "surprising inflation performance," according to 
Meyer, is an absence of "pricing leverage" among firms. This is a consequence of a "perception of 
increased competition," which makes companies afraid of increasing prices first, to avoid losing 
market share.
The conclusion drawn by Meyer is that the economy’s "excellent" performance in 1996, 
characterized by an "impressive combination of low core inflation and low unemployment," does not 
justify the conclusion that "the business cycle is dead or that the Phillips Curve is no longer relevant."
From this conclusion, Meyer recommends "a prudent monetary policy . . . based on a 
working assumption that the underlying trend of inflation has been stabilized in the past couple of 
years." Consequently, the FED will "have to maintain a close watch for signs that inflationary 
pressures are mounting."
II. 3. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION
(WDW/6/97 26 FEBRUARY 1997)
On February 10, President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the first Economic Report of 
his second mandate. The Report focuses on the "present state of the economy," draws a balance of 
the last four years, and glimpses into the prospects at the beginning of the 21st century.
In his message of transmission to Congress, looking back, President Clinton describes the 
challenge of January 1993 as "to put the economy on a new course of fiscal responsibility while 
continuing to invest in our future. " The record of the past four years reveals that unemployment is 
"down by nearly a third," from 7.5 percent to 5.4 percent, through the creation of 11.2 million jobs. 
Inflation, at an average of 2.8 percent, is "lower than in any Administration since John F. Kennedy 
was President," while "the combination of unemployment and inflation is the lowest it has been in 
three decades."
Finally, the President highlights a better distribution of the benefits, since "between 1993 and 
1995 the poverty rate fell from 15.1 percent to 13.8 percent--the largest 2-year drop in over 20 
years."
These accomplishments, according to President Clinton, are the consequence of the 
application of a "comprehensive economic agenda," which includes historic deficit reduction,
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complement markets."
An example of market failure is found in the Great Depression, when "one out of four 
workers was without a job~clearly the market was not performing well."
In some cases, "competition may be imperfect, market participants may lack needed 
information, or markets may be missing. " In still others, "would-be innovators and entrepreneurs may 
fail to capture enough of the benefits of their activity, or the users of resources, such as clean air and 
water, may escape the full costs of their use, degrading the resources for all."
Accordingly, the conclusion is drawn that "government should focus its attention on those 
areas in which markets will not perform adequately on their own."
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III. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
III. 1. CAN TECHNOCRATS BECOME POLITICIANS?
(WDW/8/97 12 MARCH 1997)
Since Plato’s philosopher-kings, there have been utopias based on claims to legitimacy other 
than the will of the people, be it the "mandate from Heaven" of the Chinese bureaucracy, or the 
Communist Party as vanguard of the people. As it is also well known, these claims to legitimacy 
sometimes have led to ugly and costly authoritarian experiments.
Latin America has been a fertile ground for some of these legitimating ideologies. However, 
Harvard Professor Jorge Dominguez, a prominent Latin Americanist, has edited a book on the present 
generation of Latin American technocrats claiming that this time it may be different.
The book’s title is Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s 
(Pennsylvania University Press, 1997). The book’s main thesis is that these policy makers are not 
common "technocrats," because they do not fit traditional definitions. Besides the claim to political 
power based on rationality and expertise, they are also political leaders dedicated to opening politics 
and markets.
Therefore, we are told in the foreword by Richard Feinberg the former president of the Inter- 
American Dialogue, he and Jorge Dominguez had to invent the term "technopols," to describe these 
new "variant of technocrats."
Professor Dominguez offers several reasons to explain why he believes Latin American 
"technopols" are different. First, they are more political than technocratic, because they have made 
economics "political." Second, they have built "their own teams and institutional bases" and 
consequently "they are not the marionettes of other politicians." Third, for them "a rational policy is 
not just technically correct but also politically enduring." Finally and above all, "technopols" are 
"bearers of a ’passion’ for open politics and open markets."
According to this description, the transition to democracy in Latin America may have given 
birth to a rare breed, a technocrat able to transform his expertise into a political asset, contributing in 
the process to freer politics and freer markets.
However, looked at more closely, only one out of the five cases has been rewarded with the 
highest office. The others’ attempts to obtain this reward for their performance as slayers of inflation 
have failed, until now.
After a successful performance as Finance Minister, Alejandro Foxley has become president 
o f the Christian Democratic Party of Chile. Shedding the mantle of technocrat, Foxley calls his 
present position "the highest form of public service. "
After five years of successful performance and a sixth year that now looks as a dismal failure,
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Pedro Aspe contended for the presidency within the Mexican official party. Bypassed twice for the 
nomination by then President Salinas, Aspe has now returned to the anonymity that befalls, in the 
Mexican political system, those who contend unsuccessfully for the highest office.
Domingo Cavallo has now returned to private life, after it was feared that his separation 
would bring down the successful, though painfül, fixed exchange rate policy he applied in Argentina. 
He is now running for president in the next elections.
Evelyn Mattei, after an unsuccessful attempt to become presidential candidate from the 
opposition in Chile, may run for the Senate in the next elections.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso is the most successful case. He became president of Brazil after 
the enforcement o f a stabilization plan that slayed hyperinflation. But Cardoso is the most atypical of 
all the cases. He is not an economist, but a sociologist who surrounded himself with a team of 
brilliant economists, such as Pedro Malan and Edmar Bacha. Also, when he became minister of 
finance, he was already a successful politician, as founder of a political party he was elected to the 
Senate.
These are some reasons that perhaps explain why Cardoso’s bid for the presidency was the 
only one that was successful of all the cases studied. Another explanation may be found elsewhere. 
Commenting on Cardoso’s election, Albert Hirschman declared to the Brazilian magazine VEJA, 
"intellectuals do not seize power frequently. This only happens in countries where elites are very 
small."
Still, the fate of the other "technopols" is not a setback, it reveals a certain strength in these 
young Latin American democracies. It is good for democracy that the successful execution of a set of 
economic policies, to control inflation, was not enough to turn the executioners into successful 
politicians, propelling them to the highest positions.
In conclusion, with the exception of Cardoso who was not a technocrat, the "technopols" 
described in this book have been successful as technocrats but have failed, thus far, in their attempts 
as politicians. Therefore, instead of trying to transform their successful performances into bids for the 
highest office, technocrats should remember one message that comes out of this book, better 
expressed by the wisdom of the old Spanish saying, "cobbler, stick to your shoes."
III. 2. GLOBALIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
(WDW/16/97 11 JUNE 1997)
A separate chapter is dedicated in the last WEO (WDW/13/97, p.4) to analyze the impact of 
globalization on the developing economies. As with the chapter on the advanced economies, dedicated 
to the same topic (WDW/15/97, p.6), the focus is on the opportunities and challenges generated by 
the globalization process.
The first consequence highlighted is that instead of convergence of income levels between the 
economies o f the world, increasing polarization has prevailed. Despite some spectacular successes 
achieved in some developing economies, such as Chile, Malaysia and Thailand, on average, real per
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capita incomes have doubled, which is roughly similar to the performance of the advanced economies. 
Therefore, there has been no convergence among both groups of economies. On the contrary, the 
finding is that, in absolute terms, the distance has widened between the developing and the advanced 
economies, while additionally there is increased polarization among the developing economies.
The "key lesson" drawn from this contrasting performance is that "countries that align 
themselves with the forces of globalization and embrace the reforms needed to do so, liberalizing 
markets and pursuing disciplined macroeconomic policies, are likely to put themselves on a path of 
convergence with the advanced economies, following the successful Asian newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs)."
The next question is what factors are necessary to achieve faster per capita income growth. To 
answer this question the WEO describes the forces of integration and the "policies to boost growth 
and promote convergence. " Among the main forces contributing to integration are trade, capital 
markets, and movements of people.
On trade, "except for countries in Asia and some in Latin America, integration with the world 
economy has been rather slow. " Except for the newly industrialized economies of East Asia and the 
so-called "rapidly industrializing economies "-Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand-the conclusion 
is that "the shares of most other developing country regions have been roughly flat or have declined."
In the nineties, there has been an increase in net private capital flows to developing countries, 
at a yearly average of $150 billion and close to $200 billion in 1996. However, these "flowed 
overwhelmingly" to about a dozen emerging market countries. Meanwhile, the flow of people across 
national borders "remains relatively small."
Therefore, these differences in the impact of integration forces account for the lack of 
convergence in the per capita incomes of the developing and the advanced economies. True, the WEO 
mentions some spectacular success stories among the developing countries, such as Korea’s tenfold 
rise in per capita income between 1965 and 1995; Thailand’s fivefold; and Malaysia’s fourfold.
However, in the Western Hemisphere the developing economies "average per capita incomes 
doubled between 1965 and 1980 before stagnating over the next 15 years." Thus, the success stories, 
do not preclude the conclusion that "many countries regrettably are not realizing their potential."
Beyond this falling behind or stagnation in almost all the developing economies, "there has 
also been a sharp decline in upward mobility of developing countries within the international 
distribution of average per capita incomes and an increased tendency of countries to become polarized 
into high- and low-income clusters."
The number of countries ranked in the lowest income quintile has almost doubled, from 52 
countries in 1965 to 84 countries in 1995. By contrast, "the middle income fell rapidly," from 49 
countries placed in the second and third income quintiles in 1965, the number had dipped dramatically 
to just 21 countries by 1995."
Because of this "thinning of the middle," the conclusion is that "there are now fewer middle- 
income developing countries, and upward mobility of countries seems to have fallen over time." The 
evidence also reveals that this downward mobility has become accentuated lately. Therefore, "while
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there was some tendency for countries to move to higher brackets and to progress relative to the 
advanced economies over the 1965-75 period, the forces of polarization seem to have become 
stronger since the early 1980s. "
The policy prescription "to boost growth and promote convergence" consists o f the following 
elements: 1) macroeconomic stability, to encourage domestic investment and the flow of foreign 
capital; 2) openness, because the fastest growing developing countries had the highest ratios of 
imports and exports to GDP; 3) limit state intervention "to areas of genuine market failure (such as 
health, education, and infrastructure)" and reduce involvement in state-owned enterprises; 4)
"financial liberalization needs to be accompanied by strengthened regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions"; 5) increase the quality of governance against the lack of transparency and 
accountability; 6) invest in human capital and restrain population growth.
Finally, "the key lesson that emerges is that no policy by itself is sufficient," therefore, "good 
policies tend to be mutually reinforcing and policy complementarities are important. "
III. 3. BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 
(WDW/21/97 16 JULY 1997)
Almost twelve years ago, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol edited a 
book with this title (Cambridge University Press, 1985). They said that, despite prevailing ideological 
fads, state autonomy and capabilities remained a relevant subject o f study. It took the World Bank the 
same amount of time to accept this conclusion, thus getting rid of the ideological grip of those who 
claimed that the best that could be done with the state was to dismantle it.
Better late, seems to say the recently released World Development Report (WDR1. titled The 
State in a Changing World. The portentous nature of this change in perspective is recognized at the 
Bank. Therefore, those in charge of presenting the Report in public have deemed it necessary to offer 
an explanation.
For instance, at the press conference where the WDR was presented, the new Bank’s Chief 
Economist and Vice-president for Research Joseph Stiglitz was asked to explain the reason for the 
change. Known for his writings on the role o f government in development, Professor Stiglitz candidly 
answered that perhaps part of the explanation was that he had not been at the Bank before.
In the same vein, Ajjay Chhibber, head o f the staff that prepares the WDR, clarified the 
objective of this year’s Report as to dispel the perception that the Bank was committed to dismantling 
the state. Chhibber added that the main explanation for the change was the influence exercised by 
those in charge of Bank’s operations. Therefore, the ideologues apparently have lost to the doers. The 
change is so obvious that it is necessary to read it to believe it. Here are some assertions made in the 
Report, which should be contrasted with the previous stance.
First, the world has changed. The command and control economies have collapsed, the 
welfare state is in fiscal crisis, the East Asian miracle cannot be understood without the state, and
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where states collapsed humanitarian emergencies have emerged.
The "determining factor" behind all these changes is the effectiveness of the state. Without an 
effective state--remember the eighties-sustainable development is "impossible." Sounds like fifty 
years ago, the Report admits, but this is only apparent, because then the state was seen as "direct 
provider. " By contrast, now, the state is seen as a "partner, catalyst, and facilitator, " no longer as 
"villain," it could be added.
Neither is there a single state model, applicable everywhere, because diversity makes every 
state "unique." As President Chirac said in Denver, "to each his own model" (WDW/20/97, p .7).
One wonders about the reaction of those policy-makers who in the past implored self-righteous World 
Bank missions to be aware of diversity and local conditions. The Report admits, with outstanding 
modesty, "no one-size-fits-all recipe for an effective state is suggested here."
Another difference with the past is that the prevailing development vision was too 
"simplistic," because what was seen as necessary then were good advisers and technical experts. 
Consequently, there was not enough accountability for technocrats, through checks and balances.
Even so, despite all the anti-statist rhetoric, governments expanded incessantly. This was the 
case particularly in the most advanced economies, where state spending, on average, represents 
almost half of total income, while in the developing economies it represents only one fourth.
The question may be legitimately asked if this is not a hint that there may be a correlation 
between development and government size. The Report only says that the question about state 
influence has shifted from "the quantitative to the qualitative." This deserves a full quotation, because 
the shift is "from the sheer size of the state and the scope of its interventions to its effectiveness in 
meeting people’s needs."
However, the Report admits that this has now turned into a "clamor for greater government 
effectiveness," which the Bank intends to attend by means of a "two-part strategy." First, get the 
following five "fundamentals right": strengthen the rule of law; maintain an environment without 
distortions, including macroeconomic stability; invest in social services and infrastructure; protect the 
vulnerable and the environment. Second, build state capability and contribute to "reinvigorating public 
institutions," through effective rules and restraints; greater competition; increased citizen voice.
Finally, globalization also threatens "weak or capriciously governed states." It "sharpens the 
need for effective international cooperation," to deal with "at least five major concerns that transcend 
national borders": managing regional crises; promoting global economic stability; protecting the 
environment; fostering basic research and the production of knowledge; and making international 
development assistance more effective.
Even international agencies have a role to play, providing technical advice; cross country 
experience; financial assistance, "to endure the early painful period of reform. "
Unveiling this major departure from its ideological past, the World Bank wants it to be known 
that they should no longer be perceived as encouraging the dismantling of the state. Now the 
conclusion is that "good government is not a luxury-it is a vital necessity for development."
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This year’s Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1997. released by the 
World Bank on September 9, predicts that the next 25 years will see "an unprecedented boost in the 
prominence of developing countries in the world economy." These projections are based on the 
following assumptions: 1) policy reforms in the developing countries will be sustained, and 2) the 
presently favorable international economic environment will prevail.
Therefore, the World Bank projects growth rates of between 5-6 percent a year that will raise 
the share of developing countries in world output, from the present one sixth to around one third by 
2020.
According to Joseph Stiglitz, World Bank Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, "the 
potential rewards of this expansion will be very large, both in terms of growth of important export 
markets and as a source of imports." Stiglitz admits that "although there will be transition costs, there 
is little evidence to justify two of the most common fears, namely downward pressure on unskilled 
wages in industrial and other developing countries and higher prices for food and energy."
Among the report’s main conclusions, which justify the optimistic projections, is that "the 
global environment for developing countries remains broadly favorable." Given a continuation in the 
advanced economies of the pattern of modest growth, with low inflation and moderate real interest 
rates, faster growth in trade and capital flows will also be sustained.
Consequently, "aggregate annual growth in developing countries is expected to rise to 5.4 
percent in 1997-2006 from only 2.6 percent in the previous decade." According to Milan Brahmbhatt, 
principal author of this year’s Prospects, "the outlook for developing countries looks much more
favorable over the next ten years than in the previous decade."
Except for East Asia, almost every region in the developing world will benefit from the 
expansion. For instance, "three regions where per capita incomes fell in the past ten years-Sub- 
Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa—are expected to see a reversal of the trend."
Also, in South Asia poverty is expected to "decline significantly as a result of more rapid 
economic growth," at an average rate of 5.9 percent in the next decade.
In East Asia, despite the recent slowdown in economic growth and monetary instability, the 
Bank still projects that growth will remain high, at an average of 7.6 percent for the next decade, but
down from the average of 10 percent of the first half of the 1990s.
With most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean "moving ahead with reforms," 
growth is projected to be over 4 percent for the decade 1997-2006. This represents an increase of 2.5 
percent in per capita growth, which contrasts with the average 0.5 percent of the previous decade.
"On balance," the Bank concludes, "the favorable external environment assumed in the 
projections implies that the growth performance of individual countries will be largely determined by 
domestic factors, especially policy developments."
III. 4. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
(WDW/31/97 29 OCTOBER 1997)
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Despite this favorable outlook, the Bank says "it would be imprudent to count on recent 
exceptional conditions continuing in all respects." For instance, the report describes a "modest boom- 
bust" scenario for the advanced economies, under which stronger growth in 1998-1999 in the United 
States can lead to a sharp corrective tightening that would precipitate a recession.
Given the relative weakness of the European and Japanese economies, it is unlikely that they 
would follow the tightening in the United States. Therefore, it is projected that the consequences of 
such tightening will not be amplified to the other advanced economies.
However, private capital flows to the developing countries would decrease, affecting 
particularly interest-sensitive portfolio bond flows. In this scenario, the most vulnerable developing 
countries are those that are financing high current account deficits with external resource flows and 
that have weak banking systems, burdened with bad debt.
Departing from its focus on how trends in the world economy influence the performance of 
the developing economies, this year’s Prospects examines how the world economy will be influenced 
by the participation of "the Big 5" developing countries-China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia.
Today, these economies account for half of the world’s labor force but for only 8-10 percent 
of world output and trade. Assuming an average rate of growth of 5-6 percent, the relative weight of 
these economies is projected to double by 2020. This is expected to generate large net benefits for 
the world economy and it "will likely redraw the economic map of the world over the next quarter 
century."
The report also examines two additional topics. First, how "global production networks 
established by multinational enterprises provide developing countries with new means to enhance their 
economic performance by accessing global know-how and expanding their integration into world 
markets."
Second, how to overcome "concerns about job losses and other adjustment costs" that are 
inhibiting "many developing countries from undertaking or extending trade liberalization."
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IV. EMERGING MARKETS
IV. 1. WHY MEXICO PAID BACK
(WDW/2/97 29 JANUARY 1997)
Do not underestimate the significance of the Mexican government decision of paying, more 
than three years ahead of schedule, its debt to the United States and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The underlying circumstances of such a decision are as extraordinary as the events of two 
years ago, which led to the Mexican bailout, but without the agitation and the sense of urgency.
For instance, recall how both Chairman Greenspan and Managing Director Camdessus pointed 
to the extraordinary nature of the crisis. Chairman Greenspan saw a challenge to Mexico’s 
"exemplar" role, since it was approaching "near-first-world status." Managing Director Camdessus 
saw a risk of spreading the perception that "the market-based approach to development had failed."
Two years after, in the announcement made at the White House of Mexico’s payment, 
President Clinton recalled how "some said that we should not get involved, that the money would 
never be repaid, that Mexico should fend for itself. They were wrong."
Therefore, it is useful to examine more closely the factors that are behind Mexico’s payment, 
to avoid reaching the facile conclusion that the advanced payment was only a symbolic gesture.
First, Mexico’s capacity to pay is based on its renewed access to world financial markets. The 
payment was made possible by the issuance of bonds for $1 billion in global bonds; $ 1 billion in 
German marks; $650 million in Japan’s Samurai market; even $330 million denominated in Italian 
lire. Additionally, several other smaller operations enabled the Mexican government to come up with 
the additional $2 billion to pay the final $3.5 billion owed to the U.S. Treasury and $1.5 billion for 
the IMF.
Second, such renewed access to world capital markets would be inconceivable, if Mexico 
would not be experiencing a most extraordinary turnaround in its external accounts. For obvious 
reasons, this comes out most clearly in the evolution of Mexico’s trading relationship with the United 
States.
Under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade between 
Mexico and the United States increased in 1996, both ways, at an average yearly rate of almost 20 
percent. This impressive rate of growth was accomplished despite the steep fall in Mexico’s rate of 
growth.
Those who look at trade balances as a measure of successful trading relationships~to be sure, 
a mercantilist perspective-wili point out to Mexico’s surplus with the United States amounting to 
$15.3 billion in 1995 and an estimated $18 billion in 1996.
However, such a measure reveals only one side of the picture, since Mexico’s imports from
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the United States, despite falling by almost 9 percent in 1995 to $46.3 billion, were still above the 
$41.6 billion of 1993, before NAFTA. More impressive still is that Mexico’s imports from the U.S. 
in 1996 will be around $56 billion, which represents an annual increase of more than 20 percent.
This reveals that trade interdependence between these neighboring North American economies 
is proceeding at an intense pace, despite the major adjustment experienced by the Mexican economy. 
To illustrate the intensity of such trade interdependence, it should be recognized that Mexico today is 
trading more with the United States than all of Latin America and the Caribbean.
This was already the case before the NAFTA, but the difference was not significant. In 1993, 
Latin American and Caribbean trade both ways with the United States amounted to almost $70 billion, 
while Mexico’s total trade with the United States, in the same year, amounted to more than $80 
billion.
In 1995, the year of the Mexican recession, the corresponding figures were $81 billion for 
Latin America and the Caribbean and $107 billion for Mexico. In 1996, the distance will increase, 
since it is estimated that total trade between Mexico and the United States will exceed $120 billion.
Finally, because of the drastic reduction in the rate of growth, enormous domestic sacrifices 
have been experienced by everybody in Mexico, particularly by the salaried sectors. As a 
consequence of the reduction in 1995 of almost 7 percent of GDP, average real wages decreased 13.6 
and 11.4 in 1995 and 1996, respectively.
As described by U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, in the New York Times, "this 
experience has been enormously painful for the Mexican people." These sacrifices have led to the 
reduction of inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, from 52.1 percent in 1995 to 27.8 in 
1996. Therefore, the reactivation of growth in 1996, at around 4 percent, still has to reach most of 
the population, particularly the salaried sectors.
Additionally, it does not help to experience such a profound correction in the middle of a 
process of convulsive transition, from an authoritarian, single party system, to a pluralist and 
democratic polity, yet undefined and uncertain. What is puzzling is that such a profound adjustment 
has not generated greater instability.
If all these factors are considered, Mexico’s payment of its debts to the United States and the 
IMF, ahead of schedule, represents more than a political gesture.
IV. 2. FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 
(WDW/18/97 25 JUNE 1997)
This is the title of a recently released report by a working party of experts from the member 
governments of the Group of Ten (G-10) and from some emerging market economies. Two of the 
experts were from Argentina and Mexico, the only Latin American governments represented.
Be it as it may, that the G-10 is interested in the financial stability of the so-called emerging
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market economies, at the specific request of the last Lyon Summit, is a reflection of the increasing 
flows of private capital going to these economies. It is also an indicator of relevance that the topic 
was included in the agenda of the Denver Summit.
According to the working party, macroeconomic instability has been increasingly "associated 
with serious problems in the financial sector. " This trend appears not only in emerging market 
economies, but also in some advanced economies. It is also becoming common for the public sector 
to assume the "resolution costs" of such banking crises.
In some cases the costs borne by the public sector have been staggering. The following are 
some of the examples cited in the study of "cumulative fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays associated with 
systemic bank restructuring": Chile in 1981-1987, 20 percent of GDP and Venezuela from 1994 to 
the present, 20 percent of GDP. Other cases have amounted to 10-15 percent of GDP, such as Spain 
in 1977-1985, or Mexico from 1994 to the present. Just the estimated fiscal cost of what in the United 
States, in the 1980s, came to be known as the Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis amounted to almost 3 
percent of GDP.
The main reason, offered to explain this propensity of macroeconomic instability to transform 
itself into banking crises, is found in the fact that "banks remain the dominant channel of financial 
intermediation in emerging market economies." For instance, "in most Asian and Latin American 
countries, banks still account for more than 80 percent of financial intermediation."
However, the study remarks, "the experience of many countries also indicates that, in a 
financial sector crisis, causality between the macroeconomic framework and financial sector soundness 
runs in both directions." This circular causation is described as follows: "while macroeconomic 
instability weakens financial institutions, an unsound financial sector, in turn, undermines 
macroeconomic performance and magnifies the effects of shocks and disturbances in the economy."
The study identifies some of the main sources of vulnerability to which are exposed the banks 
and financial sectors of emerging markets.
First, macroeconomic instability is described as "the most obvious and direct," because of "its 
adverse effect on asset price volatility and the allocation of financial resources."
Second, inflation also generates vulnerability because it "distorts incentives for both borrowers 
and creditors." However, while banks are capable of adjusting to inflationary environments, 
weaknesses are more pronounced "during the transition to lower inflation. " Therefore, "a significant 
reduction in the rate of inflation appears to have been a factor in a number of financial crises since 
1980."
Third, financial liberalization, including capital account liberalization, can also increase 
vulnerability during the transition, "by increasing die exposure to credit and foreign exchange risks." 
Additionally, an "improper sequencing of reforms" may contribute to vulnerability of the banking 
sector.
Fourth, taxation of financial institutions may "undermine financial intermediation," as the 
"choice of monetary policy instruments and central bank facilities can affect the soundness and 
vulnerability of the banking system."
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the total. Finally, other regions came in far behind, with the Middle East and Europe receiving $22.2 
billion; the transition economies $19.4 billion; and Africa $9.0 billion.
Moreover, present levels of concentration in these flows can be further illustrated by the fact 
that, throughout the 1990s, only ten countries received "almost three-quarters" of total capital flows to 
emerging market economies.
Three factors are identified in the report as decisive in stimulating such record flows. First, 
emerging markets are benefitting from the search for higher yields by investors. Second, institutional 
investors are looking for greater diversification. Third, a recognition by investors that economic 
fundamentals have improved in emerging markets.
Impressive changes have also taken place in the composition of these flows. Since 1995, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has become the largest component, reaching 45 percent of total 
private flows in 1996. The same in Latin America and the Caribbean, where more than two-thirds of 
the $77.7 billion of total net private capital flows in 1996, almost $30 billion, was FDI and $27 
billion was portfolio investment.
About half of the $1.2 trillion in net capital flows to emerging markets, between 1990-1996, 
has been accumulated as foreign exchange reserves. In Asia, 70 percent of these inflows became 
foreign exchange reserves, while in Latin America the proportion was 37 percent. Therefore, 
emerging market central bank reserve assets by the end of 1996, amounted to $822 billion, "a more 
than threefold increase since 1989."
By contrast, official flows have "declined significantly as a source of emerging market 
external finance, falling from 29 percent of total flows in 1990 to 6 percent in 1994." Because of the 
Mexican financial crisis, official flows in 1995 increased sharply to almost $40 billion, or one fifth of 
total flows. However, in 1996 they fell again, for the first time in the 1990s, to negative $13.2 
billion. In Latin America, official flows were negative by $11.2 billion in 1996, reflecting the 
substantial payments made by Mexico of official credits (WDW/2/97 p.27). Only in Africa, official 
flows remain the largest source of external finance, representing more than 40 percent of total flows 
in 1996.
A most remarkable development in emerging markets was the "increased reliance on bond 
issuance as opposed to bank lending," almost doubling, from $58 billion in 1995 to $102 billion in
1996. This was mainly a consequence of the improved access to global financial markets enjoyed by 
borrowers from emerging markets.
For instance, the number of countries rated by international credit agencies has increased from 
11 in 1989 to 46 in 1996. Also, sovereign issues were launched to restructure existing liabilities, in 
the form of Brady bond buybacks and Mexico’s repayment of obligations to the United States and 
partial repayment to the IMF. Also, in June 1997, Brazil sold $3 billion of 30-year bonds with $2.3 
billion exchanged for Brady bonds. Even Century (100 year maturity) bonds made their appearance, 
from the People’s Republic of China, the Israel Electric Corporation, India’s Reliance Industries, and 
Endesa Chile Overseas Company.
The IMF offers an interpretation of this spectacular increase in "the scale of inflows and the 
broadening of market access" of the 1990s. This is evidence, the Fund says, of "a restoration of the
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Other sources of vulnerability are "sector-specific," such as faulty corporate governance and 
management, due to "a lack of appropriate incentives to act prudently;" weak legal and judicial 
infrastructure; and lax supervision and regulation.
These deficiencies point to what the study characterizes as the "key elements of robust 
financial systems." For instance, it is necessary to create "an institutional setting and financial 
infrastructure" that contribute to a "sound credit culture and effective market fimctioning." Also, 
while markets should allow close supervision by stakeholders of financial institutions, it is necessary 
to complement "market discipline" with adequate regulatory and supervisory arrangements.
The study identifies several activities where "sound principles and practices" should be 
enforced: accounting; payments and settlements; banking supervision; securities market supervision; 
insurance supervision; and adequate supervision of conglomerates.
In each one of these areas the primary responsibility corresponds to the following 
"international groupings": the International Accounting Standards Committee; the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems of the G-10 central bank governors; the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision of the G-10 central bank governors; the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO); and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
Finally, the IMF, the World Bank and the regional development banks should promote 
actively the adoption of these measures.
IV. 3. DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS IN EMERGING MARKETS
(WDW/32/97 5 NOVEMBER 1997)
The latest issue of the yearly on International Capital Markets was released in Hong Kong, in 
late September, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Private capital flows to emerging markets in 1996, according to the report, "marked a new 
milestone in the ongoing integration of these economies into global financial markets." Net private 
capital flows to emerging markets, last year, reached "a new record level of $235 billion-a 22 
percent increase over 1995."
At these rates, in the 1990s, these flows have already exceeded the levels attained with the 
recycling of petro-dollars, in the 1970s. Present record levels are one indicator, among others, of the 
"dramatic improvement" in the terms and conditions under which emerging markets are gaining 
access to world financial markets. Additionally, "interest rate spreads fell sharply, average bond 
maturities more than doubled, lending covenants weakened, and four times as many countries now 
have access to international markets as in 1990."
Still, these flows remain highly concentrated in Asia, Latin America and a few transition 
economies, while Africa and the Middle East lag behind. In 1996, Asia remained the largest recipient 
of net private capital flows, with $106.8 billion, almost half of the total. The developing countries of 
the Western Hemisphere, as classified by the IMF, followed with $77.7 billion, around one third of

32
trend toward global financial market integration that had been evident in the gold standard period and 
the 1920s but was disrupted by the Great Depression and World War II, as well as by the capital 
controls systems of the post World War II period."
This may be only the beginning. Presently, institutional investors, who manage over $20 
trillion, have not even placed 1 per cent of their assets in emerging markets.
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V. CAPITAL FLOWS
V . 1. GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
(WDW/10/97 26 MARCH 1997)
This is the new title of what formerly was known as the World Debt Tables, the most 
important document dedicated to monitor the debt crisis of the developing economies, the issue that 
demanded more attention in the eighties.
It is a sign of the times that the World Bank finally decided to release this document with a 
new title, reflecting the lesser saliency of indebtedness and the spectacular increase in private 
investment flows to the developing countries.
The document is still divided in two volumes. The first volume, of analysis and summary 
tables, contains the following chapters: 1) advances in global markets; 2) project finance for 
infrastructure; 3) foreign direct investment and global integration; 4) the changing face of aid; and 
finally only one chapter is dedicated to 5) removing the debt overhang of the heavily indebted poor 
countries.
Most of the topics related to the debt issue appear in the following appendixes also included in 
the first volume: 1) debt burden indicators and country classifications; 2) external debt trends in 1995;
3) official external debt restructuring; 4) commercial debt restructuring; 5) portfolio investment in 
developing countries; 6) progress in privatization; and 7) regional trends in debt and flows.
The second volume contains statistical tables on the external debt and flows of the 136 
countries that report public and publicly guaranteed debt under the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting 
System (DRS).
In 1996, the main highlight in development finance was the continued surge in private capital 
flows and the contrasting stagnation of official flows. Total net long term resource flows to the 
developing countries, in 1996, amounted to $284.6 billion, an increase of $45 billion, or 20 percent, 
from 1995.
Out of this total, private flows accounted for almost 86 percent, while the rest were official 
development finance flows. The increase in private flows amounted to $60 billion, by contrast to a 
decrease of $12 billion in official flows.
The bulk of private flows was in foreign direct investment, which amounted to $109.5 billion 
in 1996, almost 40 percent of total flows and $14 billion more than in 1995. Even the commercial 
banks are staging a comeback, mainly in lending for infrastructure projects, which increased by $8 
billion from 1995.
All regions registered increasing net flows of resources in 1996, with Latin America 
experiencing the most modest increase of $2 billion, as opposed to East Asia, which registered the
34
Despite a persistent concentration of private flows in twelve developing countries, the share of 
this group is declining, from 87 percent in 1992 to 73 percent in 1996.
Four Latin American countries appear among the twelve most important recipients of net 
private flows, as follows: Mexico ($28.1 billion); Brazil ($14.7 billion); Argentina ($11.3 billion); 
and Chile ($4.6 billion). The other recipient countries are mostly in East Asia, including China at the 
top ($52.0 billion); followed by Indonesia ($17.9 billion); Malaysia ($16.0 billion) and Thailand 
($13.3 billion). The rest are countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, such as India ($8.0 
billion); Turkey ($4.7 billion); Russia ($3.6 billion) and Hungary ($2.5 billion).
Despite this persistent concentration, the share of the rest of developing countries is 
increasing, even for countries that do not have access to world capital markets. For instance, the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, in 1996, received $11.8 billion in net private capital flows, 
equivalent to ten times the amount registered in 1990.
Still, Joseph Stiglitz recently appointed World Bank Chief Economist and Vice President for 
Development Economics said "the share of private capital flows in the 1990s should continue as more 
developing countries improve macroeconomic management and open their markets to competition 
from the rest of the world. But the stakes become higher for those countries that fail to undertake 
these reforms. "
The disappointing figures are for official flows, which stagnated in 1996, since concessional 
development assistance, mainly to low income countries, experienced a "serious decline" of almost $1 
billion. In nominal terms, this is equivalent to the level of 1990 and 3 percent lower in real terms 
from 1995.
The Report also notes "a marked shift in official concessional flows in the 1990s to funding 
refugee relief and other emergency aid, including peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Rwanda, the former 
Yugoslav republics, and elsewhere." According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), "about 12 percent of all official development assistance (including technical 
cooperation grants) is now devoted to emergency aid, compared with less than 2 percent in 1990. "
On the debt front, the Report describes recent debt buybacks of collateralized Brady bonds by 
Mexico and the Philippines and debt restructuring operations by Panama and Peru, amounting to $3.9 
and $8.0 billion, respectively. Finally, there is a description of the recently agreed framework for 
resolving the debt problems of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), which moved into the 
implementation stage.
V. 2. CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
(WDW/17/97 18 JUNE 1997)
According to Charles Dallara, Managing Director of the Washington-based Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), "private capital has been flowing to emerging market economies at a 
record pace. "
largest increase of $20 billion increase in net flows.
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It should be recalled that the IIF was created in 1983, in the midst of the debt crisis and it 
includes in its membership almost 200 commercial banks from all over the world. It has now become 
a tradition that the IIF’s Managing Director releases a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Interim 
Committee, commenting on the issues that concern the Spring Meetings of the Bretton Woods 
institutions.
This year’s IIF letter is dedicated to addressing the "major challenge facing the global 
financial community," described as "how to sustain, broaden and deepen" private flows to the 
emerging market economies.
The letter reveals the magnitude of these flows, which reached $255 billion in 1996, up from 
$57 billion in 1990. By contrast, official flows to these economies are dwindling, from $37 billion in 
1990 to $10 billion in 1996.
Nearly half of these flows were in the form of equity, which last year amounted to $113 
billion. Additionally, also in 1996 non-bank flows, mainly bonds, amounted to $94 billion. Around 
half of these flows, $131 billion, went to Asia, while Latin America was a distant second with almost 
$65 billion.
Finally, according to the IIF, the buoyancy of emerging markets finance can also be seen in 
lengthening maturities and shrinking spreads. The average maturity of emerging-markets bonds 
increased from 5.8 years in 1995 to 8.3 in 1996.
Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
commenting on the IIF’s letter, said "the performance of the last two years, including the rapid 
recovery from the Mexican crisis, is so impressive as to raise the question of whether it’s too good to 
last." The IIF predicts that in 1997 these flows will remain at the same level as last year, and the IMF 
agrees with this optimism. However, both Fischer and Dallara recognize that there are risks to the 
forecast.
To analyze those risks, Fischer says, it is useful to look at the factors that explain why private 
capital flows to emerging markets have increased so rapidly. Summarizing those described in the IIF 
letter, Fischer singles out the following six major factors:
1) "an increase in expected returns in emerging markets, due to structural reforms, increases 
in the supply of assets via privatization, and enhanced macroeconomic stability";
2) "improvements in emerging market financial markets and banking systems, and other 
aspects of the economies, have reduced risks and made investments in these countries more 
attractive";
3) "liberalization of capital controls in emerging market countries, removals of restrictions in 
institutional investors in industrial countries, and technological advances in communications";
4) "portfolio diversification by investors in advanced countries, with the number of emerging 
market mutual funds having increased from 30 to 1500 in a decade, and with the flows to emerging 
markets fueled in part by the capital gains in advanced country stock markets";
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5) "improvements in information flows about emerging markets, both in the provision of data 
by emerging market countries and companies, and in the vastly improved quality of research on 
emerging markets in recent years;" and
6) "low interest rates in the advanced economies."
According to the IIF, the following are among the "possible risks to the sustainability of 
these flows: uneven industrial country performance; a slackening of reforms in emerging market 
economies; diminishing influence of multilateral institutions; and injudicious lending."
Fischer identifies "at least three elements that do present risks. First, there are emerging 
market countries where large current account deficits have to be watched, and some in which banking 
sector problems need to be dealt with rapidly. Second, capital flows to emerging markets show some 
signs of the "exuberance" that has been detected in other asset markets. In particular, spreads have 
become remarkably low. Third, interest rates in the United States have begun to raise."
Finally, the IIF also recalls that "while access to foreign capital contributes to growth," in 
emerging market economies "strong flows have three potentially harmful effects. They can: (1) 
weaken external competitiveness and burden monetary policy; (2) foster the illusion that 
macroeconomic discipline can be relaxed, and in some cases weaken political support for reforms; 
and (3) undercut efforts to boost domestic saving." The advise offered by the IIF, to counter some of 
these risks, consists of the following measures: counter upward exchange rate pressure by reducing 
underlying fiscal imbalances; sustain disciplined policies and deepen structural reforms; increase 
transparency by releasing data on a timely basis; finally, the area that requires more urgent attention 
is to strengthen and deepen financial systems. The IIF concludes that the IMF and the development 
banks can help sustain private flows "by continuing to adapt their roles in a rapidly changing world. "
V. 3. PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(WDW/19/97 2 JULY 1997)
This is the title of a book recently released by the World Bank, examining what has already 
become a most important issue of the present international economic agenda. The World Bank’s 
report joins similar explorations of this issue. First, the experts of the Group of Ten (G-10) study on 
financial stability in emerging markets (WDW/18/97, p.28), also the recent letter issued by the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) on the same topic (WDW/17/97, p .33).
Introducing the volume, the World Bank’s Vice President and Chief Economist, Joseph 
Stiglitz says that the developing countries, ready or not, are being drawn into the process of 
integration of financial markets that is leading to a single global marketplace.
This "new age of globalized capital" is characterized by the following indicators. Net private 
capital flows, excluding Korea, recently promoted to the high-income category, reached $240 billion 
in 1996. Such amounts are almost six times greater than in 1990 and four times more than the level 
reached at the previous peak, during the 1979-82 commercial bank lending boom.
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Official flows have been left far behind, since private capital flows are now five times greater 
than official flows. This represents a remarkable turnaround, since at the beginning of the nineties 
official flows were still greater.
The relative participation of the developing countries in these flows has also increased 
spectacularly. The share of developing countries in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has jumped 
from 15 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 1996, and their participation in global portfolio equity flows 
has moved from 2 percent at the beginning of the decade to almost 30 percent.
Additionally, commercial bank lending, which amounted to two-thirds of all private flows to 
the developing countries at the beginning of the eighties, now represents less than one fifth of such 
flows.
Simultaneously, governments have become less active borrowers in world capital markets, 
representing now even less than one fifth of all private flows to developing countries. However, these 
indicators also reveal that the pace at which developing economies are integrating into the global 
financial market is quite uneven, because most of these economies remain excluded from such flows.
For instance a dozen countries-listed in decreasing order, China, Mexico, Brazil, Korea, 
Malaysia, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, India, Turkey and Hungary-accounted for about 
80 percent of net private flows to developing countries during 1990-1995.
Even more concentrated, less than twenty developing countries accounted for almost 95 
percent of such flows in the same period. Therefore, 140 countries, out of a total of 166, account for 
less than 5 percent of private flows to developing countries.
On the supply side there have also been profound transformations. Perhaps most remarkable 
has been the spectacular increase in the number of institutional investors interested in international 
investments.
For instance, while total assets of pension funds in the world are estimated to have increased 
from $4.3 trillion to $7 trillion, between 1989 and 1994, the share of international investments in 
their portfolios increased from around 7 percent to 11 percent, in the same period. These two factors, 
according to the World Bank, "have resulted in an increase in total international investments by 
pension funds from $302 billion in 1989 to $790 billion in 1994."
FDI has "responded most vigorously" to the circumstances that are producing these 
spectacular increases in international investment. A major change can be observed in the primary 
motives for FDI flows going to developing economies, from the interest in "resource extraction and 
import substitution," during the 1970s and early 1980s, to "efficiency seeking, associated with the 
globalization of production. "
However, perhaps the "most striking" change has been the turn toward portfolio investment, 
from barely nil a decade ago, to almost a third of the equity capital moving across national borders 
worldwide going to developing countries, in the last five years.
Again, "the driving force behind portfolio flows of the 1990s has been institutional investors," 
with mutual funds leading the way in investing in emerging market equities. For instance, in 1986
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there were 19 emerging market country funds and nine regional or global emerging market funds. By 
1995, the numbers were "over 500 country funds and nearly 800 regional and global funds."
Additionally, the combined assets of all emerging market funds "increased from $1.9 billion 
in 1986 to $10.3 billion in 1989 to $132 billion at the middle of 1996." Therefore, the exposure of 
U.S. open-end mutual funds in emerging markets went from "just $1.5 billion in 1990 to $35 billion 
in 1995, or 14 percent of international exposure" and 2 percent of their assets.
Pension funds have followed this trend, with the exposure of U.S. pension funds in emerging 
markets amounting, in 1994, to between $50 and $70 billion, which represented also about 2 percent 
of their total assets.
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VI. U .S. TRADE POLICY
VI. 1. U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1997
(WDW/9/97 19 MARCH 1997)
This year’s trade policy agenda is the first presented in the second mandate of President 
Clinton. Therefore, it contains the main elements of what the Administration expects to accomplish in 
the next four years. The presentation of the agenda is required by Section 163 of the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2213) which mandates that "the President shall submit to the Congress 
during each year (but not later than March 1) a report on A) the operation of the trade agreements 
program . . . and B) the national trade policy agenda for the year in which the report is submitted."
Both requirements are contained in a single volume, issued on deadline by the Office of the 
U. S. Trade Representative (USTR), titled 1977 Trade Policy Agenda and 1996 Annual Report of the 
President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program. The volume also includes, for the 
second consecutive year, the annual report on the functioning of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994 Trade Act). Finally, an annex 
includes a listing of trade agreements reached by the United States since 1984, "which afford 
increased foreign market access or reduce foreign barriers and other trade distorting policies and 
practices by other parties to those agreements. "
Also, this is the first major statement on U.S. trade policy presented by Ambassador Charlene 
Barshefsky, recently confirmed as new U. S. Trade Representative. Ambassador Barshefsky’s 
appointment is an expression of continuity, since she acted as Deputy of her predecessor,
Ambassador Michael Kantor, throughout the first Clinton Administration.
The introductory overview, signed by Ambassador Barshefsky on February 28, just before her 
confirmation by the Senate, looks back and describes the major accomplishments of the "Clinton 
market-opening strategy," which covers "a wide spectrum of products and a broad geographical 
sweep."
This strategy envisages the combined application of "bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
initiatives." Its main purpose is to open new markets and make "strong gains in exports throughout 
Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the nations of the former Soviet Union."
Ambassador Barshefsky describes the "high points" of the Clinton Administration’s record in 
enforcing such a strategy. 1) approval of the NAFTA and the contribution it made to pull Mexico out 
of "its worst financial crisis in modem history"; 2) entry into force of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO; 3) the Information Technology Agreement, to enter into force in July 
1997, liberalizing trade in products where the United States enjoys competitive advantages, such as 
semiconductors, telecommunications equipment and computer software and hardware; 4) enforcement 
of the framework agreement with Japan; 5) response to the "critical diplomatic challenge" posed by 
China; 6) accomplishment of market opening initiatives within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) process; 7) progress in preparing negotiations for achieving the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA); 8) launching the initiative to build a New Transatlantic Marketplace with the
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European Union (EU); 9) advances in the consideration of "new issues," such as labor rights, the 
environment and corruption; finally, 10) enforcement of trade laws and agreements.
The 1997 agenda promises to continue implementing trade agreements, enforcing trade laws, 
opening markets, creating opportunities for U.S. business, and "continuing the legacy of U.S. 
leadership in the global economy." Economically, "strong export growth" is necessary to sustain 
strong economic growth at home. Politically, trade is a "tool" to "project America’s core values 
globally." Strategically, economic alliances are essential "to project American leadership around the 
world."
The instruments to accomplish these objectives are described in the following order. First, the 
Administration needs fast-track authority. Second, this is required to build the FTAA by 2005. Third, 
it is also required to continue encouraging APEC to open its markets, including through bilateral 
agreements with individual nations, such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Fourth, to deepen 
the relationship with the EU, through the New Transatlantic Marketplace Initiative. Fifth, to support 
trade liberalization in Africa. Sixth, the inclusion of labor standards as part of the WTO and in 
bilateral and regional trading agreements. Sixth, to incorporate new members to the WTO. Seventh, 
to enforce the two recently signed agreements on information technology and basic 
telecommunications. Eighth, other sectoral and bilateral issues, such as trade liberalization in 
agriculture, specific issues with Mexico, Japan and on shipbuilding. Finally, to continue making trade 
and environmental policies mutually compatible.
Evidently, to carry out this ambitious agenda, it is essential that the Administration obtain 
fast-track authorization from the U.S. Congress. Therefore, the section on fast-track emphasizes that 
"to achieve these goals is, in part, dependent on whether we have trade agreement authority to use as 
a competitive weapon. With fast-track, a wide range of bilateral and regional initiatives become 
possible to pursue. "
The presentation of the trade policy agenda for 1997 closes with a quotation from President 
Clinton’s last State of the Union address: "this is about more than economics. By expanding trade, we 
can advance the cause of freedom and democracy around the world, "in 1995.
VI. 2. BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS
(WDW/12/97 14 MAY 1997)
The twelfth National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) was released, 
as mandated by the law, on 31 March 1997. The 1974 Trade Act, as amended by the 1984, the 1988 
and the 1994 Trade Acts, require that the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) submit to 
the President, the Senate Finance Committee, and appropriate committees in the House of 
Representatives "an annual report on significant trade barriers."
Annual presentation of this report by the USTR has set an example, because other trading 
partners of the United States, such as Canada, the European Union, Japan, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, also release their own reports enumerating the barriers that their exports confront in the 
U.S. market.
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The law requires that the U.S. report should contain "an inventory of the most important 
barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services, foreign direct investment by U.S. persons, and 
protection of intellectual property rights. " However, the Report is not a merely descriptive exercise, 
because it is directly related to the implementation of two other U.S. trade laws. First, thirty days 
after the release of the NTE Report, under the "Special 301" provision "the USTR must identify those 
countries that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or deny fair and 
equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection. " Second, under the 
"super 301" executive order, within six months of the presentation of the NTE Report, the USTR has 
to review U.S. trade expansion priorities and "identify those priority foreign country practices, the 
elimination of which is likely to have the most significant potential to increase U.S. exports."
Trade barriers are defined broadly in the NTE Report, as "government laws, regulations, 
policies, or practices that either protect domestic products from foreign competition or artificially 
stimulate exports of particular domestic products." Additionally, barriers are classified into the 
following nine categories: 1) import policies; 2) standards, testing labeling and certification; 3) 
government procurement; 4) export subsidies; 5) lack of intellectual property protection; 6) services 
barriers; 7) investment barriers; 8) anticompetitive practices; and 9) barriers that encompass more 
than one category, such as bribery and corruption, or that affect a single sector.
This year’s NTE Report includes four more countries, for a total of 46 nations, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and two regional bodies, the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Among 
those countries recently added to the list, three are from Latin America, Ecuador, Panama and 
Paraguay, and one from Africa, Ethiopia.
With these additions, the number of Latin American countries that appear in the NTE 
REPORT has increased to seventeen, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela.
Measured by the length of their citations, Japan appears first, with 45 pages; followed by the 
European union (EU), with 25 pages, Korea is third, with 19 pages, followed closely by China, with 
17 pages.
Each country or group of countries appears listed alphabetically and the enumeration of the 
barriers is preceded by a description of the U.S. trade deficit or surplus, the amount of U.S. imports, 
exports and investment, and by the rank occupied as a market for U.S. exports.
Excluding Mexico, which still ranks third, Brazil has moved from fourteenth to twelfth, as the 
most significant export market for the United States in Latin America. Other Latin American 
countries come far behind in this ranking. Venezuela ranks twenty fourth, Colombia twenty fifth, 
Argentina twenty sixth and Chile, which moved from twenty eighth last year to twenty seventh. 
Farther behind, the Dominican Republic fell from thirty second last year to thirty third this year, 
followed by Costa Rica that fell from fortieth last year to forty first this year. Peru comes next, 
falling from thirty ninth last year to forty second this year. Honduras moved from fiftieth last year to 
forty fifth, followed by Guatemala that fell from forty second last year to forty sixth. The newly 
mentioned Panama and Ecuador rank forty ninth and fifty first, respectively, while El Salvador 
remained fifty second, with the newly mentioned Paraguay fifty fifth and Nicaragua still in the last 
place despite its move from eighty first to eightieth.
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Not all the citations are negative. For instance, the Brazilian government is said to have 
"produced significant changes in Brazil’s trade regime, resulting in a more open and competitive 
economy.’ The same is true of the government of Argentina, said to have made "significant progress 
in reducing traditional border measure barriers (such as tariff and import licensing) and non-border 
measure barriers (in areas such as investment and government procurement).
However, all the Latin American countries are cited for lack of intellectual property 
protection and for the erection of barriers against investment and services. For instance, also 
mentioned are investment incentives in the automobile sector of Brazil, lack of intellectual property 
protection for pharmaceuticals in Argentina, a Chilean excise tax on spirits, or television local content 
quotas in Colombia.
VI. 3. NAFTA’S REPORT CARD
(WDW/22/97 23 JULY 1997)
As mandated by section 512 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Implementation Act, President Clinton has sent to Congress the Study on the Operation and Effect of 
the NAFTA. In the message of transmission to Congress, President Clinton has no doubt about the 
results of the evaluation, saying that it "provides solid evidence that NAFTA has already proved its 
worth to the United States during the three years it has been into effect. "
The President places NAFTA within the wider context of the Administration’s growth 
strategy, which "has produced the strongest U.S. economy in a generation," characterized by "strong 
investment, low unemployment, healthy job creation, and subdued inflation. "
This strategy consists of the following three elements: first, deficit reduction; second, 
investing in people, through education and training; and third, opening markets, "to allow America to 
compete in the global economy."
The impact of the NAFTA is evaluated by means of the following indicators: 1) trade in 
North America; 2) trade barriers; 3) the U.S. economy; 4) the Mexican economy; 5) key sectors; and
6) labor and environmental protection.
For the United States, trade with its NAFTA partners, amounting to $426 billion in 1996, 
represents one third of its total two-way trade. The rate of growth of U.S. trade within the NAFTA, 
at 44 percent in 1996, exceeded by far the 33 percent growth with the rest of the world.
Canada remains the largest trading partner of the United States, amounting in 1996 to $290 
billion in two-way trade. However, while U.S. exports to Canada, between 1993 and 1996, increased 
by 33.6 percent, U.S. exports to Mexico grew by 36.5 percent, in the same period. Therefore, U.S. 
exports reached a record high increase in 1996, despite the profound recession experienced by the 
Mexican economy, equivalent to a contraction of 3.3 percent in domestic demand.
In the first four months of 1997, U.S. exports to Mexico were similar to those going to 
Japan, the second largest trading partner of the United States, "even though Mexico’s economy is one
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twelfth the size of Japan’s. "
NAFTA’s impact may be better appreciated by looking at trade relations within the Western 
Hemisphere, not mentioned in the report. For instance, in 1996 for the first time, Mexico’s two-way 
trade with the United States, at $131 billion, surpassed by a wide margin Latin American and 
Caribbean total trade with the United States, at $102 billion. Moreover, in 1996, U.S. exports to 
Mexico, at $56.8 billion, were almost the same as those going to the rest of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, at $52.5 billion. However, the most spectacular difference was in U.S. imports from 
Mexico, which in 1996 reached $74.3 billion. By contrast, U.S. imports from the rest of Latin 
America and the Caribbean remained far behind at $49.5 billion.
Under NAFTA, Mexico has reduced its average import tariffs, which were at 10 percent in 
1993, by 7.1 percent, while U.S. tariffs, at an average of 2.07 percent, have been reduced by 1.4 
percent. Therefore, U.S. relative participation in total Mexican imports increased from 69.3, when 
NAFTA went into effect, to 75.5 percent in 1996. This reflects, according to the study, a 10 percent 
average tariff advantage over other suppliers.
The report cites other studies that have attempted to isolate the effects of the NAFTA on the 
U.S. economy, from the severe recession and devaluation in Mexico and the tariff reductions from 
the Uruguay Round. The conclusion is that NAFTA had "a modest positive effect" on the U.S. 
economy. For instance, a study by DRI estimated that NAFTA increased real exports to Mexico by 
$12 billion in 1996 and imports from Mexico by $5 billion. Another study by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas concluded that U.S. exports to Mexico increased $7 billion, while imports from 
Mexico increased only $4 billion.
Estimates of job creation associated to U.S. exports to Mexico are between 90,000 and 
160,000. These should be contrasted with the petitions for assistance filed under the NAFTA 
Transitional Adjustment Program (TAA), at the U.S. Labor Department. Until December 1996, 
NAFTA-TAA related petitions covered approximately 99,497 workers whose jobs had been affected 
by imports from Canada and Mexico.
As it could be anticipated, NAFTA’s effects on the Mexican economy are more important. By 
contrast with the crisis of 1982, when Mexico increased tariffs by 100 percent and U.S. exports fell 
by half and took seven years to recover, under the NAFTA tariff reductions continued in Mexico and 
U.S. exports recovered in 18 months.
The study also analyzes NAFTA’s impact on several sectors of the U.S. economy, such as 
textiles, automobiles and electronic appliances. For instance, in the apparel industry, U.S. imports 
from Mexico increased from 4.4 percent in 1993 to 9.6 percent in 1996. Meanwhile, the share of 
U.S. apparel imports from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea fell from 39 percent in 1993 to 30 
percent in 1996.
Therefore, the report card presented by the Administration on NAFTA is positive, but its 
effects on the U.S. economy are modest. NAFTA’s impact on U.S. trade relations is significant, 
particularly within the Western Hemisphere.
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After a long and protracted battle for what some called "the soul" of the Democratic Party, 
President Clinton decided to withdraw the request for authorization to negotiate trade agreements on 
’fast track.’ The President thus decided to retreat, instead of experiencing a defeat inflicted by some 
leaders of his own party. Additionally, in a puzzling political paradox, the leadership of the 
Republican Party could not come up with five votes, estimated necessary to approve the measure, in 
the late hours of a long weekend of congressional hyperactivity.
Such are the ways of Washington, where "all politics is local." In the south grounds of the 
White House, President Clinton conceded defeat. He asked, "was there some politics in it? Of course, 
there is. But there is politics in every tough vote that has been held in the Congress and in any 
legislative body in my lifetime."
The President explained quite candidly what happened. First, he said, for several years there 
has been a "big debate" within the Democratic Party "on the question of trade and its role in our 
economic future."
Second, the President had the support of most Democratic mayors and governors and a 
majority in the Senate. But he did not have a majority in the House of Representatives, where the 
Democratic leadership was openly against the President’s position.
Third, since he could not come up with enough Democrats in support of his position, "a 
bigger share of the Republican vote" was necessary. However, this ignited a "controversy over 
international family planning," which could not be solved. Therefore, the President said, "had we 
been able to resolve that, I think we could have gotten enough votes on the Republican side, to go 
with the Democrats’ votes we had, to pass the bill. Clearly, I think we could have. But we were not 
able to do that. "
The President concluded optimistically saying: "I expect that we will successfully press 
forward with this issue in this Congress, and at the appropriate time. So I’m, I’m not particularly 
concerned about the long run. I think we’ll be able to prevail."
Be it as it may, the aftermath has consisted of assessing the consequences of this setback for 
the bipartisan, centrist coalition that approved the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Uruguay Round.
There is almost unanimous agreement that President Clinton has been weakened by the 
resistance that emerged within his own party. For instance, the Wall Street Journal estimated that, for 
the President, "the defeat could hasten his descent into lame duck status." As an indicator, the Journal 
said that the President was unable to obtain the support of 80 percent of the House Democrats. The 
JOURNAL also quoted George Stephanopoulos, a close presidential advisor in the first Clinton 
Administration, who said that, legislatively, "the last three years will be largely a rhetorical 
presidency. "
Internationally, this will be reflected in the next summit of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, as in the next summit of the Americas, to be held next April in Santiago,
VI. 4. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REQUEST FOR ’FAST TRACK’
(WDW/34/97 19 NOVEMBER 1997)
4 5
Chile, where it is expected that negotiations will be launched for the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA).
On this last possibility, administration sources are quick to remind that the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were launched when President Reagan did not have fast track authorization. The same 
sources also recall that last month, in Brasilia, Presidents Cardoso and Clinton agreed that
negotiations for the FTAA were to start at the Santiago summit.
The main casualties of the defeat were Chile and the countries of Caribbean and Central 
America that participate in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), better known as 
CBI.
Without fast track authorization, Chile remains standing at the door of the NAFTA, where it 
has been since the last Miami summit. Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Miguel Insulza was 
also quoted, in the Wall Street Journal, saying that even the Santiago summit was at risk. The 
participants in the Santiago summit, "won’t move much of anything if the U.S. does not have this 
authority."
The CBI countries were also hurt, because they had previously been defeated in the U.S.
Congress in their attempt to obtain parity with the treatment granted in the NAFTA for the products
excluded from the CBI. These governments argue that, with the approval of the NAFTA, intense 
trade and investment diversion is taking place from their countries, because investors prefer to settle 
in Mexico due to the access it enjoys in the U.S. market.
Given these consequences, optimists, like President Clinton, said "this bill is not dead . . .  we 
will bring it back up at the appropriate time and when we think we can pass it. "
Pessimists, like Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, said "maybe it will come back to life next 
year, but I would expect it would be even more difficult" to pass.
Finally, some skeptical observers are hoping that the withdrawal of the request for fast track 
does not signal a sustained turn toward protectionism in the United States.
46
VII. TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
VII. 1. THE RECIFE TRADE VICEMINISTERIAL
(WDW/7/97 5 MARCH 1997)
The second viceministerial on Hemispheric trade, in preparation of next May’s ministerial 
meeting, was held in Recife, Brazil, from February 25 to 27.
The mandate for the viceministerial is part of the ongoing implementation of the decisions 
adopted, in December 1994 in Miami, by thirty four heads of state and government of the Americas. 
The purpose of these meetings is to prepare the ground for the creation, starting in 2005, of the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
In their last meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia, the trade ministers decided it was time to 
respond to the basic questions raised by how and when to start the negotiations.
After Recife, four proposals have been presented to respond to these basic questions. Two 
proposals circulated before the Recife meeting. One month before, a Canadian proposal was 
presented, while the proposal from the United States was circulated two weeks before.
Additionally, on the first day of the viceministerial meeting, the Brazilian delegation 
circulated the proposal supported by MERCOSUR, describing in detail the position sketched during 
the previous viceministerial of negotiating in three stages. Finally, the Jamaican delegation, on behalf 
of CARICOM, presented a formal proposal at the end of the first day of meetings.
Gone is the skepticism about the participants’ commitment. Although the proposals reveal 
differences and coincidences about how to carry out these complex negotiations, the Recife meeting’s 
highlight was that the proposals contain more coincidences than differences.
The details contained in each proposal were not even discussed, it was enough just to place 
them side by side, in a matrix, to discover the agreements and disagreements. Therefore, the decision 
was that each participant would examine the matrix leaving the discussion of the differences for the 
next viceministerial, to be held in Rio de Janeiro by mid-April. Furthermore, the Brazilian delegation, 
was asked to begin drafting the project of declaration that will be the main outcome of the next 
ministerial meeting of Belo Horizonte.
The matrix comparing the proposals has five components: 1) level of obligations; 2) 
focus/phases/calendar; 3) format of the negotiations; 4) business facilitation and immediate action; and
5) smaller economies.
The main difference revealed by the matrix has to do with the sequencing of the negotiations 
and what to do first. The MERCOSUR proposal contains a detailed sequence, whereby the 
negotiations would take place in three stages, beginning with the easiest and concluding by focusing 
on the toughest.
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In the first phase of the MERCOSUR proposal the negotiations would be focused on business 
facilitation and they would last until 1999. The second phase would focus on standards and disciplines 
and it would last until 2002 and the final phase would conclude on 2005 and focus on other 
disciplines and market access.
By contrast, the US proposal contains two phases. The first one is similar to the second phase 
of the MERCOSUR proposal and would start immediately and last until 2000, while the second phase 
is similar to the third of the MERCOSUR proposal.
The Canadian and CARICOM proposals do not contain phases and all four agree that the 
kickoff for the negotiations should be the next Summit of the Americas, to be held in Santiago, Chile 
in March 1998.
If the drafting of the matrix did not generate major discussion, the other issue that dominated 
most of the Recife meeting required more time and detailed discussion. It had to do with the 
instructions to the eleven working groups that have been gathering information on different 
negotiating topics.
There was agreement that the eleven working groups that exist do not represent the number of 
negotiating groups that will be required and that a smaller number of them will be established for the 
negotiations. Still, as mandated by the Cartagena ministerial, terms of reference were submitted for 
the creation of a twelfth working group on dispute settlement procedures.
Indicating a high degree of sensitivity, the most debated instructions to a specific working 
group were those for the one that has functioned on the small economies. After lengthy discussions, 
the attempt by some delegations to introduce language that could anticipate a negotiating outcome on 
this issue led only to reiterate the terms of reference already approved in the Cartagena Ministerial.
It was also evident that there still remain differences among the small economies about how 
to deal with this issue. The delegations from the CARICOM and the Dominican Republic were more 
emphatic in their demand for specific language about negotiating outcomes. The Central American 
delegations, short of two participants because of the absence of Nicaragua and Guatemala, were less 
cohesive. Honduras appeared closer to the CARICOM position, while El Salvador and Costa Rica 
appeared less inclined at this point to insist on specific language.
Finally, there was agreement that the next viceministerial in Rio de Janeiro will have to last 
more, from April 15 to 18, since the purpose is to start drafting the project of declaration that the 
trade ministers will issue at the end of their meeting in Recife, scheduled for mid May.
VII. 2. THE RIO DE JANEIRO TRADE VICEMINISTERIAL 
(WDW/11/97 7 May 1997)
The third viceministerial on Hemispheric trade, in preparation of next May’s ministerial 
meeting of Belo Horizonte, was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from April 13 to 17, 1997.
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As it is known, the mandate for the viceministerial emanates from the Miami Summit of the 
Americas, of December 1994, under which thirty-four heads of state decided the creation of a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), by 2005.
This third, but not last, viceministerial held in Brazil became more focused on the 
preparation of the statement that will be issued by the Ministers of Trade, when they, meet for their 
third annual meeting, in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in mid-May.
Other items on the agenda were the reception of reports from some working groups, left 
pending from the previous viceministerial; terms of reference for the launching, at the next 
ministerial, of a new working group on dispute settlement procedures; and terms of reference for a 
feasibility study on the creation of a secretariat for the negotiations, to be requested from the 
Tripartite Committee OAS/IDB/ECLAC.
Final reports from the working groups on small economies, investment and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures were presented at the beginning of the meeting. Additionally, the 
viceministers authorized the release of documents prepared by the working groups on standards and 
technical barriers; on subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties; and on government 
procurement.
Based on the discussion of a first draft, the viceministers agreed that the final version of the 
terms of reference and the chair for the new group on dispute settlement will be approved by the 
Ministers in Belo Horizonte. Uruguay and Venezuela have presented themselves as candidates to 
coordinate this last working group.
Also discussed by the Viceministers were the terms of reference for the feasibility study 
required to create a secretariat for the negotiations, which will be requested from the Tripartite 
Committee OAS/IDB/ECLAC.
The viceministers decided that those governments interested in serving as hosts of the - 
negotiations should submit their proposals to the Brazilian chair, in order for those sites to be 
considered as alternatives in the feasibility study. Informal manifestations of interest in serving as 
sites for the negotiations were expressed by Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama.
Most of the meeting was dedicated to drafting the declaration that will be approved by the 
Ministers in Belo Horizonte. The discussions were based on two projects submitted by the Brazilian 
chair and by the delegation of the United State and it took place in two stages. First, the outline of the 
declaration was agreed and second, the viceministers attempted to find consensus on the specific 
language of the declaration, based on a common proposal submitted by the chair.
Basic consensus emerged that the Belo Horizonte declaration will instruct the viceministers to 
identify the elements that will be included in the declaration that the heads of state will issue to launch 
the negotiations, at the next Santiago Summit of the Americas, in March 1998.
For this purpose, the viceministers will meet three times, under the new Costa Rican chair 
that starts functioning after Belo Horizonte. The purpose of the next three viceministerials is to 
prepare the fourth ministerial meeting of San José, Costa Rica, in February 1998, which will draft the 
text that will be proposed to the heads of state before the Santiago summit.
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Therefore, the attempt at drafting the Belo Horizonte declaration consisted in finding points 
on which there was consensus, leaving "in brackets" those issues on which there was no agreement.
These "brackets" are the items that will be discussed by the fourth viceministerial, to be held 
in Belo Horizonte, two days before the ministers meet. Although many differences remain about the 
content of the Belo Horizonte declaration, most of them are not substantive, they concern mainly the 
specific language to be used in the declaration.
However, some substantive differences persist. For instance, the MERCOSUL delegation 
holds that the negotiations should take place in three different stages. By contrast, the United States 
informed that they would not insist in their original proposal of holding the negotiations in two stages.
Finally, there is also disagreement about how to incorporate into the ministerial meeting the 
results of a labor forum that will be held for the first time in Belo Horizonte, similar to the business 
forums that until now have preceded other ministerial meetings. Only the delegations of MERCOSUL 
and of the United States agree that the conclusions of the labor forum should be presented to the 
Ministers.
Consequently, after the Rio meeting, there is consensus that formal negotiations for the FTAA 
will be launched at the Santiago Summit. Meanwhile, as agreed in the Cartagena ministerial, the 
Costa Rican government will host the next ministerial, which will take place before the Santiago 
Summit. In these terms, the new host consulted tentative dates for holding the next three 
viceministerial meetings and the ministerial.
Until then, forthcoming activities will be centered on identifying and agreeing on the elements 
of the portentous declaration of the 34 heads of state launching the negotiations to negotiate the terms 
of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
VII. 3. THIRD TRADE MINISTERIAL IN BELO HORIZONTE
(WDW/14/97 28 MAY 1887)
The third ministerial on Hemispheric trade liberalization took place in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 
on 15 and 16 May 1997. The mandate for the meeting emanates from the Miami Summit, of 
December 1994, when thirty four heads of state decided the creation of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, by 2005.
In preparation of the Belo Horizonte ministerial, the trade vice-ministers held four meetings, 
chaired by the host government, to draft the project of declaration that was approved by the 
ministers. Therefore, the agenda of the meeting was centered around the approval of the points left 
pending by the last viceministerial, held also in Belo Horizonte only two days before the inauguration 
of the ministerial.
Viewed from the vantage point of the way they were covered in the media, particularly in the 
Brazilian media, the meetings were portrayed, in the terms of Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Guido Di Telia, as "a David vs. Goliath confrontation." However, Minister Di Telia concluded that
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without this perspective, the press would be without news and then the big news would come out that 
there was agreement. This characterization of the Belo Horizonte Ministerial perhaps is closest to 
what happened during the three days of intense consultations, at both viceministerial and ministerial 
levels.
To be sure, as soon as there was agreement that the negotiations will be launched at the 
Santiago Summit, in March 1998, the Belo Horizonte ministerial was devoid of a sense of urgency. 
This allowed leaving for the next meetings, to be chaired and held in Costa Rica, the most difficult 
and controverted issues.
Even so, there were disagreements that held back issuing the final communiqué until the very 
last minute. Among these, as revealed by points 14 and 4 of the final declaration, language was found 
to include labor participation and the coexistence of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
with bilateral and subregional agreements.
The reception by the Ministers of the conclusions of a labor forum became the most 
contentious issue of the meeting. These were contained in a Declaration of the Workers of America, 
where several participating governments were accused of being anti-democratic, because of their 
opposition to receiving the conclusions. In the end, the Brazilian chair circulated the declaration 
among the participants, which led to its rejection, particularly but not only, by those governments that 
were mentioned.
Still, other controversial issues were addressed generically, in a way that left them pending 
for the forthcoming meetings. As with the issue of negotiating in stages, proposed by MERCOSUL, 
point 4 declares that the next San Jose ministerial "will formulate how the negotiations will proceed, 
including such features as their objectives, approaches, structure and venue."
At the end of the day, the outcome of Belo Horizonte reveals that consensus already exists on 
some major points. These are contained in a section of the declaration that describes "areas of 
commonality."
For instance, first, decision making will be by consensus of the 34 participating governments. 
Second, the outcome of the negotiations will be a "comprehensive single undertaking," that will be 
consistent with the WTO. Third, governments can participate in the negotiations individually or in 
sub-regional groups and "special attention should be given to the interests of the small economies." 
Fourth, it will be necessary to set up "a temporary administrative Secretariat to support the 
negotiations." Fifth, 2005 is "the date for concluding negotiations, at the latest." Henceforward, the 
Viceministers are instructed to function as a "Preparatory Committee" to deal with the "remaining 
issues" and to oversee the functioning of the working groups that have been created.
With the addition in Belo Horizonte of a working group on dispute settlement procedures, the 
twelve working groups are now instructed to identify "negotiating alternatives in their respective 
disciplines." When the negotiations start, these working groups will be "reconfigured as negotiating 
groups."
Another agreement was to request from the Tripartite Committee OAS/IDB/ECLAC to carry 
out a "feasibility study on alternatives for establishing a temporary administrative secretariat. " For 
such a purpose, specific terms of reference for the study were also approved.
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According to the approved terms of reference, the secretariat will be temporary and it is 
expected to perform the following tasks: 1) support for the negotiating groups; 2) translation of 
documents and interpretation of deliberations; 3) maintain, publish and distribute official documents.
Moreover, the terms of reference specify that "support to the negotiating groups is separate 
from any provision of technical advice to FTAA participants." Therefore, in tune with recent 
subregional institutional developments in the Hemisphere, the temporary secretariat will only perform 
administrative tasks, it will be devoid of initiative and will not grant technical assistance to the 
participating governments.
Nine cities in the Hemisphere submitted their candidacy to become sites of the negotiations 
and secretariat-Buenos Aires, Kingston, Lima, Mexico City, Miami, Panama City, Rio de Janeiro, 
Bogota and Washington.
VII. 4. TRADE REPRESSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
(WDW/23/97 30 JULY 1997)
Enough evidence is available to demonstrate that trade relations in the Western Hemisphere 
are below potential.
A quick look at the latest figures reveals that the most intense trading relationship among any 
pair of countries in the world exists in the Western Hemisphere. Two-way trade between Canada and 
the United States in 1996 was close to $300 billion and this represents almost half of all trade within 
the Western Hemisphere.
Moreover, at the ongoing rate of growth, Mexico in 1997 may become the United States 
second most important trading partner, surpassing Japan. In 1996, two-way trade between the United 
States and Mexico amounted to $131.1 billion. Thus, Mexico alone, as a consequence of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), traded significantly more with the United States than the 
rest of Latin America and the Caribbean together. Two-way trade between Latin America and the 
Caribbean, excluding Mexico, with the United States amounted in 1996 to $102.0 billion.
Such intense trading relationships are influenced decisively by shared land borders and 
geographical proximity. However, trade figures between the United States and the rest of Latin 
America and the Caribbean reveal, contrastingly, that it remains far behind the levels already attained 
by Canada and Mexico.
For instance, two-way trade between Brazil, the largest Latin American economy, and the 
United States amounted in 1996 only to a bit more than $20 billion. Also, in 1996, two-way trade 
between the United States and MERCOSUR, which includes Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, barely reached $30 billion.
By contrast with the trade figures for the two neighboring economies of the United States, the 
figures for Brazil and MERCOSUR constitute solid evidence that trade relations between the United 
States and the rest of the Hemisphere are below potential.
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It is unfortunate that the notion of "trade repression" does not exist, as does the equivalent 
term "financial repression. " However, both convey the existence of circumstances, either deliberate 
measures or structural factors, which obstruct and distort trade or finance relations.
As in financial repression, equivalents of negative interest rates, subsidies and direct controls 
can be found in trade relations, in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers, direct subsidies and even 
licensing and direct controls.
However, in the developing economies of the Western Hemisphere, basically as a 
consequence of the unilateral liberalization of the eighties enforced as a sequel to the debt crisis, most 
of the traditional obstacles to trade have been gradually dismantled.
True, there remains a hard core of obstacles to be removed, but these are of a kind that is 
more difficult to remove unilaterally. These remaining obstacles are more amenable to reduction by 
means of detailed negotiations, particularly among significant trading partners, which exhibit higher 
levels of interdependence.
Therefore, the contemporary trend in the Western Hemisphere, for the removal of remaining 
obstacles to trade, has been dominated by regionalism among neighboring trading partners.
This trend complements the movement towards global liberalization within the framework of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Both trends towards trade liberalization, the regional and the global, can be fully compatible. 
Additionally, there is almost widespread consensus, except among a small hard core of global 
liberalizers, that regional trade liberalization can be a stepping stone, or a building block, for the 
construction of a more open world trading system.
In this context should be placed the project, endorsed by thirty-four heads of state and 
government of the Hemisphere in Miami in December 1994, of building a free trade area in the 
Americas by 2005, encompassing from Alaska to Patagonia.
For this reason, the most recent attempts at regional integration undertaken in the Western 
Hemisphere, in the nineties, have attracted a lot of attention. Three of these recent attempts can be 
considered the most significant, enumerated chronologically, the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the still to be negotiated 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
This does not mean that previous attempts at regional integration in the Western Hemisphere 
have lost relevance. However, previous subregional integration schemes in the Hemisphere are now 
struggling to adapt themselves to a new reality. This new reality includes two subregional newcomers, 
that count among their participants the most significant economies of the Hemisphere, and the future 
all inclusive Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Such adaptation is required from the oldest subregional process, the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), the most ambitious, the Andean Pact known today as the Andean 
Community, and the most pragmatic, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Consider the significance of bringing together MERCOSUR and NAFTA, the two subregional 
processes of integration to which belong Brazil and the United States. Both account for 85 percent of 
intra-hemispheric trade and both represent more than 95 percent of the Hemisphere’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).
Moreover, consider the enormous potential that would be unleashed by freeing the trading 
relations between these two integration processes. This can be better appreciated by focusing on the 
fact that Brazil’s two-way trade with the United States in 1996 amounted to only $20 billion, while 
two-way trade between the United States and MERCOSUR amounted to almost $30 billion.
VII. 5. THE POTENTIAL OF A MERCOSUR-NAFTA NEGOTIATION
(WDW/24/97 10 SEPTEM BER 1997)
These figures are certainly not commensurate to the size of these economies, which illustrates 
the point made in a previous DISPATCH that trade relations within the Hemisphere remain below 
potential (WDW/23/97, p.49).
In addition, there is also evidence that while U.S. exports to Brazil have been growing at an 
average rate of about ten percent, Brazilian exports to the United States have stagnated at around $8.7 
billion since 1994.
It is true that such stagnation reflects the structural adjustment experienced by the Brazilian 
economy under what is known as President Cardoso’s Real Plan. However, it also emphasizes the 
need for engaging in deliberate measures to overcome the obstacles that are hindering the 
development of trade relations among these two giant economies.
As indicated by the figures revealing the stagnation of Brazilian exports to the United States, 
Brazil cannot afford, for too long, to lose market share in the United States. The reason is that for 
Brazil, besides MERCOSUR, the United States remains the most important market for its non- 
traditional exports and its most sophisticated manufactures. Therefore, circumstances are compelling 
the governments of both Brazil and the United States to negotiate and adopt jointly more deliberate 
ways of dismantling existing trade barriers.
For the United States, interest in the negotiations is based also on a compelling need to 
preserve market share in a region that is becoming the fastest growing market for U.S. exports, but in 
which U.S. products are subject to increased competition from rival advanced economies.
By the force of numbers, therefore, Brazil and the United States must improve their bilateral 
relations to the point that both envisage the same outcome in the forthcoming hemispheric trade 
negotiations, which include the members of MERCOSUR and NAFTA. If the two giant economies of 
the Hemisphere are looking in the same direction, there will be grounds to anticipate a positive 
outcome for the negotiations.
For this purpose, the United States will have to exercise active leadership. It has been recently 
confirmed, again, that the only way the United States can exercise effective international leadership is 
if it is based on a solid bipartisan consensus.
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Recent events have demonstrated that neither the Administration, nor the Congress can do it 
alone in international affairs. Their active collaboration is more than ever essential for the 
accomplishment of a proactive international agenda.
Therefore, it is encouraging that, by the end of this month, the President will seek fast track 
authorization to negotiate trade agreements.
The timing is right, since the thirty-four Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere have 
recommended launching negotiations to create a Free Trade Area in the Americas (FTAA) at the next 
Summit of the Americas, in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998.
However, it is not essential for launching the negotiations that President Clinton travels to 
Santiago, next April, endowed with fast track authorization. Experienced observers recall that the 
Uruguay Round was launched, in 1986, before the President of the United States obtained fast track 
authorization. But there is also consensus that the approval of fast track would represent a very 
encouraging signal.
Additionally, as clarified in the Economic Report of the President, practicing the principle of 
nondiscrimination, as the cornerstone of the present international trading system, makes of trade 
liberalization a public good. Consequently, since the results of negotiations benefit everybody, it is 
essential that the United States also practice "with ingenuity . . .  the artful use of the fear of 
exclusion," to persuade "free-riders" against sitting back, while others liberalize.
Also, the United States, as the leading economy in the present international system, must 
make sure that practicing regionalism is compatible with global trade liberalization. This means that 
the process of negotiation cannot involve exclusively "principal suppliers," or major trading partners. 
It has to include the smaller economies of the Hemisphere and those that are relatively less developed.
Only in this inclusive manner can the process prove it is open and accessible to at least those 
governments who originally participated in the Miami Summit. This means that the principle of open 
regionalism must be observed by all the participants.
Finally, the private sectors from all the participating countries, understood in the widest 
sense, must also be incorporated into the negotiations for the FTAA.
VII. 6. SAN JOSE TRADE VICEMINISTERIAL
(WDW/25/97 17 SEPTEMBER 1997)
The first viceministerial on Hemispheric trade, in preparation of next year’s ministerial, was 
held in San Jose, Costa Rica, from July 28 to 31, 1997. The mandate for the meeting emanated from 
the Belo Horizonte Ministerial, which instructed the Viceministers of Trade, from the 34 governments 
that participated in the Miami Summit of 1994, to function as Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) to 
launch the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations.
There was some expectation about the meeting, because it was the first of the recently created
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Prepcom and the first of three viceministerials that the Government of Costa Rica will chair as new 
host, until the next Ministerial to be held in San Jose, on 19-20 March 1998.
Three topics dominated the discussions in San Jose. First, the functioning of the twelve 
working groups that have been carrying out the groundwork for the negotiations; second, how to deal 
with the small economies; and third, the outline of the San Jose Declaration, that the Ministers of 
Trade will issue in March 1998.
The Prepcom drafted a list of instructions basically aimed at completing the tasks that have 
been requested from the working groups. There is consensus that, at some point, the existing working 
groups will become negotiating groups, consequently, those groups that have been operating will have 
to cease functions.
The instructions are contained in a general guide reproduced as Annex 3 of the meeting’s 
minutes. The priority for all the working groups, except for the one on dispute settlement, is to 
present alternatives to the next Prepcom meeting on technical issues and negotiating approaches.
Specifically, the working groups also were instructed to consider explicitly the relevance of 
their conclusions for the smaller economies and to present their conclusions to the next Prepcom 
meeting in October. If there is no consensus within a Working Group on certain issues, the different 
alternatives discussed will have to be elevated also for the consideration of the next Prepcom meeting.
Finally, the working groups are instructed to consider the recommendations of the Business 
Forum, especially those made on business facilitation measures. For this purpose, each working group 
was instructed to organize joint seminars and conferences with the private sector.
How to deal with the small economies came to the forefront, again with full force, as the 
Viceministers were drafting the instructions to the working groups. Despite the functioning of a 
specific working group, dedicated to this topic, there seems to be no consensus yet on how to deal 
with the participation of the small economies.
The delegations from these economies are divided on how to approach the issue. One group 
holds that it is necessary to discuss the topic in all the working groups, to identify specific measures 
aimed at assuring the full participation of the small economies in the negotiating process. Another 
group holds that this is not necessary, because the specific recommendations that will emanate from 
the working group on small economies will be enough to deal with the issue.
Behind this divergence among the representatives of the small economies, which cuts across 
some existing subregional integration processes, lies a different perception of the treatment that will 
be granted to these economies. Obtaining non-reciprocal, preferential treatment still exercises a 
powerful attraction among some governments. Others believe, by contrast, that circumstances have 
moved this possibility beyond such unilateral measures and that, today, there is no substitute for 
reciprocal concessions granted through negotiations.
This divergence remains as one of the most difficult to have appeared during this preparatory 
stage. Meanwhile, the working groups were instructed to make specific recommendations to the next 
Prepcom meeting.
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Also discussed by the Viceministers was an annotated outline of the San Jose Declaration, 
which will have to be approved by the ministerial of March 1998. The outline was based on the 
Declaration of Punta del Este of 1986, which launched the Uruguay Round negotiations, containing 
the following items: objectives; general principles; issues for negotiation; participation; management, 
organization and site. The delegates commented on the outline and requested from the chair the 
preparation of a draft, including their comments, for consideration of the next viceministerial.
Another point discussed during the meeting were measures for business facilitation. The next 
business forum was asked to include such measures in the agenda of the next meeting, to be held in 
San Jose from 16 to 18 March 1998. The outcome was that the chair was asked to prepare a 
document, to serve as basis for the discussions that will take place on business facilitation during the 
next viceministerial.
The chair also proposed new dates for the next meetings as follows: second viceministerial, 
28-30 October; third viceministerial, 10-12 February; business forum, 16-18 March; and fourth 
ministerial 19-20 March.
To conclude, by contrast with the previous meetings, chaired by bigger economies, this time 
the new chair made a difference. Except for the always-thomy treatment of the small economies, 
there were no major controversies and most of the issues were discussed in a cordial atmosphere. It 
was evident that the chair by a smaller economy appears as having less of an agenda of its own, 
which makes less controversial the presentation of initiatives and suggestions.
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Before departing to a prestigious academic job in the West Coast, Richard Feinberg, the most 
senior "Latin Americanist" of the first Clinton Administration, has written a description of the Miami 
Summit. The books’ title is Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 1997).
Feinberg considers his participation in these events the most valuable contribution he made 
during his tenure as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs, 
at the National Security Council (NSC). What this lengthy title means is that Feinberg, for almost 
four years, was President Clinton’s closest advisor on Latin America.
His credentials for that position were impeccable and his appointment raised high expectations 
among the small but outspoken Washington network of Latin Americanists. It is fair to say that he 
lived to that promise, particularly because of his role, described in the book jacket, as "an architect of 
the Summit of the Americas. "
Given his decisive contribution to the Summit, Feinberg promises a book of historical 
interpretation, policy analysis and prescriptive advice, but that is also a personal memoir.
There is always a risk that "instant" memoirs avoid controversy and end up being either 
boring descriptions of rituals and formalities, or self promotion exercises. Feinberg recognizes these 
inherent risks of being a "participant-observer" and avoids both pitfalls with dexterity.
For instance, he never uses the first person singular and gives more credit to others than to 
himself. Additionally, when he cannot avoid talking about himself, he uses the more modest third 
person, identifying himself as "the author."
The other pitfall is more difficult to overcome, because the book deliberately refrains from 
revealing secrets, since it is based on "cleared" documents and interviews with participants, most of 
which remain unidentified. Still, Feinberg offers a good description of the preparatory events that led 
to the Summit and he is right, given the history of U.S.-Latin American relations, just the fact that 
the Summit took place is already an accomplishment.
Feinberg attempts to enliven the description of Summit preparations identifying several 
villains and heroes. Perhaps the main villain is the bureaucracy. He has a Kissingerian perception of 
the National Security Council’s role, as the purveyor of substance to bureaucratic rituals more 
concerned with procedure.
Among the delegations, the Brazilians from Itamaraty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are 
singled out as constant spoilers. This triggered a response, from the Brazilian Ambassador to the 
United States, saying that Feinberg is still too paternalistic and that he is obviously not used to 
negotiating with partners that have a mind of their own.
Finally, the idea of "hemispherism," understood as closer political and economic ties among 
the nations of the Hemisphere, has also many enemies in both the United States and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. These are identified as isolationism, nationalism, Bolivarianism, Yankeephobia,
VII. 7. FEINBERG ON SUMMITRY
(WDW/26/97 24 SEPTEM BER 1997)
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imperialism, protectionism, and so forth.
Among the heroes of the narrative, within the U.S. government and perhaps with an eye on 
2000, Vice President A1 Gore is singled out. By contrast, President Clinton comes out not as deeply 
engaged. Perhaps the unsung heroes are the profound changes in Latin America and the Caribbean 
that have led to the emergence of democracies and open economies.
But the book is not only an attempt to describe what happened, it also draws a balance 
between strengths and weaknesses of what resulted from the Summit. The accomplishments were the 
emergence of a new agenda, which overcame the North-South divide in the Hemisphere and that 
expanded the scope of collective action. The weaknesses were that the agenda, with its 23 initiatives 
and more than 150 actions, was too broad and ambitious. Additionally, there was no commitment to 
dedicate fresh financial resources to accomplish the goals, which revealed in effect that, with a few 
exceptions, the diplomats managed to avoid committing their governments to binding obligations, 
backed by credible enforcement mechanisms.
That represents an honest evaluation of the outcome, although Feinberg tries to show, using a 
Spanish saying, that the governments have moved from "dichos" to "hechos," (from words to deeds). 
However, he must have forgotten that in Spanish the saying has a pun, "del dicho al hecho, hay 
mucho trecho" (from word to deed, there is a long stretch).
Therefore, the author accomplishes three of the four objectives he promises to deliver in the 
book’s introduction. The description of the origins and the policy processes that led to the Miami 
Summit, the evaluation of its accomplishments and shortcomings are among the strengths of the book.
Unfortunately, as a "personal memoir," the book remains far from the goal. Particularly 
because of the absence of an explanation for the still incomprehensible fact that the author 
immediately after the Summit quietly left the Administration, despite his convictions about the 
accomplishments and promises of summitry in the Hemisphere.
This enigma remains unanswered and demands explanation. Perhaps Feinberg will do that, 
hopefully when distance and time allow it, in his next book.
VII. 8. GUANACASTE TRADE VICEMINISTERIAL
(WDW/33/97 12 November 1997)
The second viceministerial on Hemispheric trade liberalization, in preparation of next year’s 
San Jose ministerial, was held in Playa Conchai, Guanacaste, Costa Rica, from 28 to 30 October
1997.
The mandate for the viceministerial emanates from the Belo Horizonte Ministerial, which 
instructed the viceministers of trade, from the 34 governments that participated in the Miami Summit 
of 1994, to function as Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) to launch the negotiations for the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
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The meeting’s agenda contained the following topics: 1) report by the Chair on the IV 
Ministerial and IV Business Forum of the Americas; 2) revision of the reports submitted by the 
working groups; 3) structure of the negotiation; 4) feasibility study on an administrative secretariat; 5) 
technical note on business facilitation; 6) outline of the Declaration of San Jose.
Three topics dominated the discussions in Guanacaste. First, the principles and objectives of 
the negotiations; second, the structure of the negotiations; and third, the creation of an administrative 
secretariat.
The discussion about the principles and objectives of the negotiations took place as part of the 
analysis done by the PREPCOM of the different proposals presented by the working groups, 
summarized by the chair in a matrix, according to the instructions each group received from the first 
PREPCOM.
The discussions of these principles and objectives were the lengthiest, because the delegates 
were drafting the text of what will later become the draft of the Declaration of San Jose, which will 
be elevated to the Ministers.
As a result of the discussions, several points of consensus have emerged from the proposals 
presented by the working groups. However, it was left to the discretion of the working groups to hold 
additional meetings, with the exception of the group on sanitary and phitosanitary regulations, which 
was instructed specifically to meet again, to attempt achieving consensus among still divergent 
proposals.
Perhaps the issue that will require more debate is a proposal presented by the delegation of 
MERCOSUR, which continues participating in the debates with impressive discipline through a single 
spokesperson.
The Viceminister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, on behalf of the four member countries of 
MERCOSUR, proposed that the negotiations be subject to the following three principles: balance, 
gradualism, and simultaneity.
The MERCOSUR delegation understands these principles in the following manner: 1) Balance 
means that the process and the results will "contemplate the objectives and interests of all the parties."
2) Gradualism refers to the evolution of the negotiations, which should take place in accordance with 
the sequence demanded by each thematic area." 3) Simultaneity consists of the requirement that 
partial understandings be part of a general agreement, in accordance with the commitment that the 
result of the negotiations will be a "single undertaking."
The MERCOSUR delegation indicated that these principles, presented for the first time, 
replaced the position previously held that the negotiations should take place by stages. Several 
delegations requested clarifications about these principles proposed by MERCOSUR, while the debate 
about them was left for the next meeting.
There was also agreement that the Chair should gather all the points of consensus and 
incorporate them in the project of declaration, which will be also discussed in the next meeting.
The discussion on the structure of the negotiations was based on two separate written
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proposals, presented by the Canadian and the U.S. delegations, and other verbal proposals presented 
by several delegations.
The main difference between the Canadian and the U.S. proposals lies in the number of 
working groups proposed. The Canadian proposal suggests the creation of three main negotiating 
groups, on goods, on services and on rules, and a consultative group on smaller economies and 
another group on dispute settlement and institutional issues.
The U.S. proposal enumerates the following nine negotiating groups: market access, 
investment, services, government procurement, subsidies, competition policy, intellectual property, 
antidumping and countervailing duties, and dispute settlement. Additionally, the U.S. proposal 
includes the creation of two "study groups," on labor and environmental issues.
The MERCOSUR delegation, in a verbal presentation proposed the creation of a negotiating 
group dedicated to agriculture. While there was also opposition to placing the group on small 
economies at a consultative level.
The preliminary discussion revealed consensus on the role of the Ministers of Trade, as the 
supreme decision making body of the negotiations. There was also agreement that the Viceministers 
will conduct the negotiations, through their participation in a "negotiation committee." Other issues 
were discussed, such as the number of negotiating groups and subgroups and how to deal with the 
small economies and with dispute settlement procedures, but they were left for the next meeting.
On behalf of the Tripartite Committee (OAS-IDB-ECLAC), the representative from ECLAC 
summarized the contents of the previously circulated study. The Prepcom received the study and 
asked the chair to initiate consultations with the purpose of building consensus on this issue.
Several delegations confirmed the candidacy of different cities as siege for the Secretariat. The 
candidates are: Bogota, Buenos Aires, Kingston, Lima, Mexico, Miami, Panama, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Washington. The Brazilian delegation presented a detailed proposal, including costs, of locating the 
Secretariat in Rio de Janeiro.
Finally, the delegations were asked to present, by November 17, comments and observations 
on the document presented by the chair on business facilitation, to be discussed in the next meeting, 
which will take place in San Jose, Costa Rica, on 10-13 February 1998.
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VIII. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
V in .l. THE RESILIENCE OF SOME INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(WDW/27/97 1 OCTOBER 1997)
Funding international organizations has become entangled with the reduction of domestic 
fiscal deficits. In the most advanced economies, the reduced margin that exists to balance domestic 
budgets comes from the difficulties of cutting those expenditures that finance so-called "entitlements."
This rigidity emanating from expenditures in entitlements has led to concentrating the search 
for balanced budgets on so-called "discretionary" spending, among which figure most prominently the 
contributions to international organizations.
In these conditions, expenditures earmarked for certain specific activities, which may be 
eliminated without major consequences, have become easy victims of domestic bickering about 
balanced budgets.
Attempts to overcome these fiinding controversies, through negotiations, have only led to 
stiffening the conditions for disbursements to meeting certain targets. This has led to some instances 
of outright micro-management by the contributing governments.
However, there are exceptions to this trend toward austerity and "cherry-picking," which 
prevails among governments concerning the functioning of international organizations. It has remained 
almost unnoticed that there is a group of international organizations that have escaped some of the 
budgetary restrictions and the nasty debates which prevail today.
This group is composed by some international organizations whose operational budgets are not 
financed by outlays that are subject to a yearly authorization by the parliaments of the member 
countries. Such is the case of international financial institutions (IFIs), as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as of the regional and subregional development banks.
Notice that the contributions to the capital of these institutions have not escaped the 
controversy. Only the IFI’s operational budgets have not been subject to the scrutiny and approval of 
the national parliaments of the member governments. The main reason is that these operational 
budgets are not financed with voluntary contributions from the member governments. This is not the 
case, for instance, of the most vulnerable peace-keeping operations of the United Nations.
The budgets of the IFIs are financed from the mandatory commissions collected for executing 
the loans that these institutions grant to their member governments and, to a lesser degree, to the 
private sectors of the member countries.
As integral parts of the loans granted, the commissions are paid by the debtors. Therefore, 
they enjoy the same sovereign guarantees that protect all the loans granted by these multilateral 
institutions.
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It is not that these operational budgets are unaccountable. To be sure, the annual meetings of 
the Boards of Governors and the meetings of the Executive Directors, as representative organs of the 
member governments and as the supreme level of decision making of the IFIs, approve every year 
their operational budgets. However, the sources of funding such budgets are not subject to the 
discretion of the parliament of each member government.
Therefore, a paradox of plenty has emerged in these times of parsimony and austerity in the 
functioning of some international organizations. On one side, those institutions that depend for their 
funding from the yearly budgetary outlays of its members receive increasingly less, amidst 
acrimonious debates about allegedly unaccounted bureaucratic waste. On the other, the multilateral 
financial institutions increase their operational budgets without much controversy.
Moreover, even the contributions to the capitalization of the multilateral financial institutions 
are relatively less controversial.
For one thing, these contributions may not lead to actual disbursements. As in the case of the 
multilateral development banks, government commitments to their capital serve only as guarantees for 
raising the resources through the emission of highly graded paper in international capital markets.
The same can be said of the IMF, which according to its Managing Director Michel 
Camdessus functions as "a financial cooperative. " Each member of the Fund contributes a "quota" in 
foreign exchange and national currency, which does not increase outlays because it is the equivalent 
of a deposit in a bank. For instance, the United States considers its quota subscription as "an 
exchange of assets with the IMF, not as a budgetary outlay."
Additionally, donors and recipients are aware of the concrete benefits that emanate from the 
salvage operations and the development projects executed with the funding from these multilateral 
financial institutions.
Finally, circumstances are making funding these institutions even less controversial, as the 
flows of resources coming out of the IFIs constitute an increasingly less significant proportion of the 
total flows of capital in the world. For instance, in 1996, funds from the multilateral financial 
institutions represented only 15 percent of all the flows of resources going to the developing 
economies. Private, not official, capital flows constitute today the most important source of funding 
for the developing economies (WDW/10/97 p .32).
VIII.2. THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/29/97 15 OCTOBER 1997)
President J. Wolfensohn, in the introduction of this year’s annual report, says that the past 
fiscal year, from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, has been characterized by "renewal" at the World 
Bank. The Report’s overview, perhaps with some hyperbole, refers to "an escalation of the process of 
renewal" at the Bank.
The specific objective of all the changes that are taking place at the Bank, according to
6 4
approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the same fiscal year. Therefore, the 
World Bank no longer holds the first place as provider of official development finance to Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The IDB has taken that leading position.
The three largest borrowers from the Bank in F Y 97 were China ($2.5 billion), Russia ($1.7 
billion) and Argentina ($1.4 billion). The three largest borrowers from IDA in FY 97 were India 
($903 million); Vietnam ($349.2 million); and China ($325 million). Overall, in FY 97, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Peru appear among the top ten borrowers from the Bank and IDA together.
In the section dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean, the Report identifies the main 
development challenges that exist in the region, as "serious poverty, inequality and unemployment. " 
Additionally, the average rate of growth of 3 to 4 percent a year for most of the countries in the 
present decade is characterized as "insufficient to permit sustained progress on poverty reduction."
To carry out these operations for F Y 98, the executive directors approved a total 
administrative budget of $1,423.9 million and a net administrative budget $1,212 million. This 
represents an increase of almost $50 million from FY 96, after decreasing during the previous three 
consecutive years. The increase is due to the execution of the "Strategic Compact" of reforms.
Finally, at the end of FY 97, regular and fixed term staff numbered 5,443, down from 5,681, 
as of 30 June 1996. Also, in FY 97 207 new staff members were hired, of which 30 percent were 
from developing countries and 40 percent were women. The expectation is that during FY 98 
recruitment of new staff will remain at a higher level, due to the requirements of the "Strategic 
Compact" of reforms.
VIII.3. THE IMF ANNUAL REPORT
(WDW/30/97 22 OCTOBER 1997)
This year’s annual report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for the fiscal year ending 
30 April 1997, marks the inauguration, on 1 January 1997, of the third mandate for its Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus.
Against the background of a world in economic recovery, the Report describes IMF 
operations in the following fields. First, surveillance of members’ performance, including new topics, 
such as banking soundness, data dissemination, and good governance. Second, existing financial 
instruments were adapted, with the continuation of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) and the initiative, with the World Bank, to help heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). 
Finally, the adequacy of quota resources and increasing capacity to borrow were also under 
consideration, as in the case of the eleventh quota increase and the creation of the New Arrangements 
to Borrow (NAB) (WDW/5/97, p.2).
Another significant development in FY 96/97 was the endorsement by the Interim Committee 
of the IMF’s Board of Governors, in April 1997, of the need to amend the Articles of Agreement to 
make capital account liberalization a Fund’s task. The amendment will give the Fund appropriate 
jurisdiction to oversee the orderly liberalization of capital movements, which are of decisive 
importance for the stability of today’s international monetary system.
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Additionally, the Executive Board recognized "the vital importance of good governance for 
economic efficiency and growth. " Among other factors, emphasis was placed on efficient use of 
public resources, the creation of an environment conducive to private sector activity, and public 
support for economic reforms.
Total new commitments, during fiscal year 96/97, in 28 new stand-by, extended and ESAF 
arrangements, reached SDR 5.3 billion (more than $7.1 billion). This represents "a moderation in the 
demand for IMF resources," compared with the commitments for 95/96 of SDR 19.7 billion (almost 
$27 billion) and SDR 16.6 billion (about 23 billion) in 94/95.
The decrease in new commitments is explained by the fact that in 95/96 there were several 
large operations. One for SDR 6.9 billion (about $10 billion) for Russia, the largest extended 
arrangement in IMF’s history. Also, Mexico was closely behind with SDR 6.8 billion, under a stand­
by arrangement amounting to SDR 12.1 billion.
By contrast, this year’s drawings were more moderate, reaching SDR 5.6 billion, including 
SDR 2.1 billion by Russia, SDR 512 million by Algeria; SDR 321 million by Argentina; SDR 598 
million by Ukraine; and SDR 350 million by Venezuela.
Repayments exceeded drawings, amounting to SDR 7.2 billion, including voluntary advance 
repayments by Mexico for SDR 2.6 billion and SDR 140 million by Hungary.
Consequently, the IMF’s liquidity ratio, the relation between uncommitted usable resources 
and liquid liabilities, rose to 121 percent, at the end of April 1997, compared with a level of 90 
percent a year earlier.
Providing technical assistance and training to the member governments were also among the 
main activities, amounting to 14 percent of the Fund’s total administrative expenditures, during F Y 
96/97. To carry out these technical cooperation activities, the Fund also increasingly uses external 
sources.
Total person-years of technical assistance granted by the Fund, in FY 96/97, amounted to 
172.7, down from 220.0 in 94/95 and 211.4 in 95/96. Out of these total, 104.2 person-years came 
from external sources, such as the Japanese government with 67.3 person-years, and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) with 21.5 person-years.
To carry out its work program, the Fund in FY 96/97 hired 2,903 staff years from 121 
countries, compared to 2,927 staff years the previous year. By nationality, almost 26 percent of IMF 
staff was from the United States, 33.2 percent from Europe, 14.8 percent from Asia, and 11.8 
percent from the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Recruitment of new staff amounted to 133 staff members in calendar year 1996, out of which 
67 were economists, 24 were other professionals and 42 were support staff. By gender, in calendar 
year 1996, women amounted to 46.3 percent of total staff and 27.7 percent of combined professional 
and managerial staff. Among economists, the largest group of professionals in the Fund, the share of 
women was 18.6 percent in 1996. Among managerial staff, only 9 percent were women, by contrast 
with 85 percent of support staff who are women.
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The Fund’s administrative budget for FY 96/97 amounted to $490.5 million, with actual 
administrative expenditures during the year amounting to 471.6 million and capital project 
disbursements amounting to $151.5 million, including $137.8 million for major building projects. For 
FY 97/98 the administrative budget will increase to $503.6 million and the capital budget to $42.6 
million.
Surveillance with 27.8 percent and use of Fund resources with 25.7 percent, both, were the 
activities that required more than one half of the Fund’s administrative budget during FY 96/97. 
Finally, membership in the Fund remained constant at 181 countries, with the Republic of Palau 
applying for membership in December 1996.
